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**PAPUAN ETHNO-POLITICAL CONFLICT: CAUSES,
CONTEXTS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

by

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March 2004

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POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines causes and contexts of conflict in the Papua province of Indonesia. The Papua conflict is categorized as an ethno-political conflict as groups of Papuan ethnics raise some incompatible issues about the government of Indonesia. They are expressing their political ideas with various actions from rebellion to non-violent political campaigns. The Indonesian government, at the same time, has chosen various policies from counter-insurgency to accommodation. The counter-insurgency policies, however, have escalated the conflict and regenerated more grievances to the Papuans that increase international concerns. Thus, this thesis argues for a peaceful resolution over the Papua conflict through negotiation and accommodation. The thesis also expects the active engagement of the civil society at the local, national, and international levels.

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I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PAPUA CONFLICT AND AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of the conflict in Papua through two levels of analyses: macro and micro. The macro level examines the contexts of the conflict and considers how strategies of the Papuan ethno-political groups, the policies of the GOI, and the political environments of international communities are mutually reinforcing and have led to the escalation as well as de-escalation of the conflict. The micro level analysis will examine the conflicting issues, behavior, and attitude of the conflicting parties in more details which are the government of Indonesia and the Papuan ethno-political groups. The understanding of the conflict from both the macro and micro levels then will be considered in order to find a possible conflict resolution. The conflict resolution will be taken as an offered suggestion or recommendation of this thesis. More precisely, this thesis will provide the general answer to the following three major questions

- What are the root causes of the conflict?
- How do the strategies of the Papuan groups, the policies of the GOI, and the political environment of international contexts shape and determine the dynamic of the conflict?
- What are the possible and reasonable resolutions that will be accepted by the actors and stakeholders of the conflict?

This implies that in order to solve the conflict, both the GOI and the Papuan ethno-political groups must be able to negotiate to find a solution and reconcile their past history. The future of the GOI policies has to be acceptable to the Papuans and the Papuan groups have to agree with the policies. The international community can play a significant role as mediator for the negotiations and a guarantor for the implementation of the agreements. As it democratizes, the GOI will face demands from its provinces to decentralize more power to the local level. The process of governmental decentralization and devolution of power will probably remain a work in progress for the foreseeable future. The government of Indonesia then has to identify a set program of reform that will

integrate the Papua province more fully into Indonesia. This promises to be a monumental undertaking. Also, the Papua conflict resolution can serve as a model for nation-wide conflict prevention.

The claim of Papua's cultural identity within the unitary state of Indonesia has mounted in the political landscape of Indonesia during the last five years. The Papuan groups are raising their concerns over the exploitation of land and natural resources, demanding protection of their indigenous identity and the preservation of their traditions, and seeking justice, equal rights, opportunities, and a greater role for Papuan indigenous people in a provincial government. The strategies that are chosen by the Papuan political groups vary from rebellion to open nonviolent protests. Groups of scattered small-scale guerilla of the Free Papua Movement (OPM), for instance, have fought against the Indonesian security forces since the province became the 26th province of Indonesia in 1969. The Papuans have also chosen another strategy in which the Papuan leaders are advocating independence with demonstrations and peaceful campaigns from rural to urban areas. They formed a pro-independence political body in June 2000, namely the Papuan Presidium Council (DPP). The DPP claims to be the single most widely accepted and inclusive body representing the aspirations of ethnic Papuans.¹

The demands for more equality, justice, citizen participation, and greater decentralization to the provincial government level are serious challenges to the new democratic government of Indonesia and need to be addressed consistently. The issues of participation and decentralization are important as both are methods of expanding and improving public services, which would in turn help the government gain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, and thus aid in the stability of democracy. It is also part of the deepening democracy that implied democratizing the state by giving citizens more direct participation in deciding public policy, and by ensuring that public services reached the entire public.

Therefore, the government of Indonesia has to identify a way to accommodate the demands. A set of programs of reform that will integrate Papua province more fully into Indonesia will be a monumental undertaking. It is more likely that the process to give

¹ The Council on Foreign Relations, "Indonesia Commission: Peace and Progress in Papua" in *Report of an Independent Commission*, 2003, p. 105.

greater self-government from the central government to the provinces will remain an important effort for the foreseeable future of a more democratic state of Indonesia. Unless the government of Indonesia (GOI) can resolve the conflict, its ability to adapt and create a modern and stable state must be called into question. The Papua province poses another challenge to Indonesia's transition to democracy with a strong demand for more autonomy and a local government. For the Papua province, it is an experience of political transition. The outcome of this process is not yet clear, but it is hoped that the "Special Autonomy" policy of the central government of Indonesia will provide a legal and formal basis to the province for self-government as well as preserve its unique identity and tradition.

The Papua province occupies half of the eastern-most island of the Indonesian archipelago, Papua Island, and shares the island with the sovereign nation of Papua New Guinea. The province became the 26th province of Indonesia after a referendum, called the Act of Free Choice, which was sponsored by the United Nations in 1969. The province consists of more than 1,000 islands with an area about 421,918 square kilometers (21.78% of the total area of Indonesia). Its boundaries are the Pacific Ocean in the North, the *Arafura Sea* in the South, the *Seram Sea*, the *Banda Sea*, and the *Maluku Province* in the West, and Papua New Guinea in the East. The province is rich with natural resources such as copper, gold, nickel, petroleum, silver, marble, coal, and logging. Indeed, because of its richness of natural resources and mining, the province has been considered important to the Indonesia state.




Figure 1. The Map of the Papua Province

Based on the data of 1998/1999, the Province is divided into administrative regions of two municipalities (*kotamadya*), 11 regencies (*kabupaten*), 173 districts (*kecamatan*), 91 sub-districts (*kelurahan*), and 2,803 villages (*desa*).² Papua's indigenous people are Melanesian, the same ethnic origin as those in Papua New Guinea and other Melanesian people of the Pacific. Therefore, they are ethnically different from the rest of Indonesia.³

This thesis will be organized into five chapters.

Chapter I will discuss the background of the Papua conflict. It will also describe the purposes and arguments of the thesis. A set of theoretical framework reviews will be also included in this chapter as the basis for conflict analysis and conflict resolution.

Chapter II – Micro Analysis - will analyze the dynamic causes of the Papua conflict by looking at the three components of conflict which are the conflicting issues, attitudes, and behavior of the parties in conflict. The analysis is limited to the five years between 1998 and 2003, the period when the GOI showed an inclination to grant more regional autonomy to the Papua province and the Papuan ethno-political groups to have

² BPS Propinsi Daerah Irian Jaya, *Irian Jaya in Figures* (Jayapura: BPS, 1998).

³ Indonesia consists of more than 300 ethnic groups of which 45% Javanese, 14% Sundanese, 7.5% Madurese, 7.5% Malay, and 26% others.

more varying strategies for their struggle. It uses Galtung's Conflict Triangle to analyze the conflict by comparing issues, behavior, and attitude as its vertices.

Chapter III hopes to convey a sense of the Papua conflict in its national, local, and international contexts. It is important to understand the historical interplay of forces in the local (provincial), domestic (national), and international contexts that have determined the structure of conflict in Papua. Historical thinking in this thesis is also critical, not just for the sake of the past, but also to delineate the limits of feasible reform in the Papua province today, so that it is possible to recommend policies that are plausible and effective.

The analysis of the dynamics of the Papua conflict will be explored and used as a basis for the resolution framework in Chapter IV. This is likely to include social, economic, and political reforms that should be done by the GOI at the national and provincial levels. A requirement for resolution is for both parties to sit down for dialogue and negotiate a better future for the Papua province and for Indonesia in general.

This thesis closes with conclusions and recommendations. In the conclusions, this thesis will review all the findings from the analysis of the dynamic causes and the contexts of the conflict as described in Chapters II and III respectively. The recommendations of this thesis consider the possibilities and reasonability of actions and policies of the Papuan groups, the GOI, and international actors.

B. THESIS PURPOSED AND ARGUMENTS

This thesis argues that there is a causal relation between the strategies of Papuan ethno-political groups and Indonesian state policies that, in turn, are mutually reinforcing and lead to the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. At the same time, international factors help shape the aspirations, opportunities, and strategies of Papuan ethno-political groups. They also affect Indonesian policies toward the Papuan ethno-political groups. The term Papuan ethno-political is used in this thesis to denote Papuan groups whose ethnic identity is the basis for collective political action.

The thesis found that the Papua conflict results from deep social and historical roots that are fueled by enduring grievances as well as ongoing inequalities. This thesis argues that even though the conflict between the GOI and the Papuan ethno-political

groups seems to be alarming as the second East Timor case, the Papua conflict is still at a manageable level. The conflict can be resolved and managed with the active participation and good will from all the parties. The parties have to understand that the resolution of their conflict is a process of democratization and institutionalization of the democracy within the Indonesian state itself, and it is a long-term process. It requires socio-economic-political reforms at both the national and local levels. It also requires a reconciliation process at the local level to manage the conflict in a more sustainable way. National and local leaders must understand both the issues and the reform process.

The policy of the GOI to give Special Autonomy status to Papua is more formidable though it is not without challenges. Under this policy, the Papua province will have greater autonomy to self-govern and preserve its unique identity and traditions. The province will receive 80% of the central government's revenue from the exploitation of Papua's natural resources and, at the same time, gain greater recognition and respect for the political rights of the indigenous people. This Special Autonomy policy seems to satisfy the demands of the Papuan ethno-political groups. The challenge to the GOI, however, is to be consistent with this policy reform. Another challenge is to manage those who benefit from the current centralized policies of the GOI, such as the logging companies who gained the right to explore Papua's forest from the central government but are protested against by the local people.

The Papuans, on the other hand, must support and participate in the reform processes. They need to prepare and be ready to accept the responsibility for a greater self-government under the Special Autonomy policy. Unfortunately, the less developed and educated of the Papuan indigenous people will pose the greatest challenge to the Papuans. The diversity of the society, consisting of more than 300 tribes scattered throughout the jungles, forests, highlands, and islands, will be another challenge to develop the resources. More seriously, the local institutions required to manage these resources may be inadequate to the task. In this sense, the Papuans still need to work with the central government of Indonesia to continue social, economics, and political developing programs in the province. The Papuans also have to work with non-Papuans who already live and work in Papua. This implies a more inclusive identity of Papuan ethno-political groups so that they not only belong to Papuans but also to non-Papuans.

Greater self-government may make it more acceptable for Papuans to be part of Indonesia. However, the strengthening of the local government might also encourage the independence movement. Either approach will force Indonesia to redefine itself as something other than its traditional image of an authoritarian and centralized state. Instead, it must become a democratic, religiously tolerant, and multiethnic nation. Indonesia's political basis of "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" or "unity to diversity" should offer a guarantee of racial and ethnic tolerance. The Special Autonomy policy is a necessary short-term policy to win "the hearts and minds" of the indigenous people of Papua. It is, however, insufficient. It requires other policies to curtail the level of tension, violence, and possible human rights abuses of the Indonesian security forces and the military wing of the Papuan independence movements. In the long-term, both the GOI and the Papuan people have to be willing to get beyond their history of mutual conflict and establish a more sustainable basis for Papuan integration into the Indonesia state.

C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE PAPUA CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION

Conflict usually happens when two or more peoples or groups are dealing with different and sometimes contradictory dynamics in different dimensions, and they behave and react accordingly.⁴ Conflict may be viewed as occurring along cognitive (perception), emotional (feeling), and behavioral (action) dimensions.⁵ The way people react and behave in response to their differences will determine if the conflict becomes violent or non-violent. The way people deal with conflict is a matter of habit and choice⁶ but it is possible to change habitual responses and exercise intelligent choices according to Kriesberg⁷, who argues that it is possible to develop ways to reduce the harm and increase the benefit of conflict. Galtung⁸ sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes, and behavior are constantly changing and influencing one another. As

⁴ Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

⁵ Bernard Mayer, *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: a Practitioner's Guide* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000).

⁶ Miall, et al., *Ibid.*

⁷ Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1998).

⁸ Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage, 1996).

a conflict emerges, it becomes a conflict formation as the parties' interests come into conflict or the relationship in which they engage becomes oppressive. Conflict parties then organize around this structure to pursue their interests. They develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behavior. Thus, the conflict formation starts to grow and develop. It may widen, drawing in other parties, deepen and spread, generating secondary conflicts within the main parties or with outsiders. This often considerably complicates the task of addressing the original or core conflict.

However, the real conflict in a community within a state is not easy to understand when studied. It is complex both because it may have a long history and involve many parties. Goor⁹ found that conflicts usually have roots far beyond the present day or yesterday, and that it may be necessary to return to colonial times or earlier, to put all the factors involved into their proper context. In the context of the Northern Ireland conflict, McCartney¹⁰ found that the colonial history of the English conquest of Ireland continued to influence the attitudes of the English and the Irish towards each other. They also show, at times, the bewildering variety of factors and circumstances that conspire to make a situation conflict-prone. Another factor that contributes to the complexity of the conflict in Northern Ireland is the involvement of so many actors, parties, or stakeholders, both inside and outside Northern Ireland.

Mayer¹¹ develops *The Wheel of Conflict* as a way to understand the complexity of conflict and why conflict sometimes seems to proceed in contradictory directions. Mayer argues that people engage in conflict either because they have needs that are met by the conflict process or because they have, or believe they have, needs that are inconsistent with those of others. The conflict cannot be solved unless these needs are addressed in some manner. Needs usually are embedded in five forces that can generate and define conflict: the ways people communicate, emotions, values, the structures within which

⁹ L. van de Goor, "Causes of Conflict in the Third World" in *Major Findings of the Research Project* (Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 1996), Executive Summary.

¹⁰ Clem McCartney, "Striking a Balance: The Northern Ireland Peace Process" in *Accord Peace Journal*, 8 December 1999, pp. 1-11.

¹¹ Bernard Mayer, *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A Practitioner's Guide* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000).

interactions take place, and history. All these different sources of conflict interact with each other. For example, the history of people affects their values, communication style, emotional reactions, and the structure in which they operate.

Galtung proposed another model of conflict, *The Conflict Triangle*. He suggested that conflict could be viewed as a triangle with contradiction (C), attitude (A), and behavior (B) as its vertices. Contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived incompatibility of goals between parties. Attitude includes the parties' perception and misperceptions of each other and of themselves, either positive or negative. Attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness, and hatred. Behavior as a third component includes cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility.

Galtung argues that the three components have to be present together in a full conflict. A conflict structure without overt conflicting attitudes or behavior is a latent, or structural, conflict. Galtung's model gives useful direction to the conflict resolution that must involve a set of dynamic changes to deescalate behavior, a change in attitude, and transforming the relationship or clashing interests at the core of the conflict structure.




Figure 2. The Conflict Triangle

Another useful conflict analysis approach to explain the Papuan - GOI conflict is a longitudinal conflict progression by Adam Curle. He suggests¹² that conflict moves

¹² Adam Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock, 1971).

along a continuum from un-peaceful to peaceful relationships. This movement can be charted on a matrix that compares two key elements: the level of power between the parties in conflict and the level of awareness of conflicting interests and needs. The matrix is useful for plotting where in the progression, at any given moment, a conflict is located. Curle proposed that it is possible to understand the movement toward peace through the roles that emerge in a typical progression of conflict through four major stages.




Figure 3. The Progression of Conflict

In Quadrant 1 of his matrix, conflict is latent or “hidden” because people are unaware of the imbalances of power and injustices that affect their lives. At this point, Curle argues, education in the form of con-scientization is needed. In Quadrant 2, conflict is an overt confrontation and it is no longer hidden. The confrontation itself, however, involves a series of choices regarding how the conflict will be expressed and how the concerns will be addressed. These choices range between violent or non-violent mechanisms or a combination of both. In Quadrant 3, confrontation moves toward negotiations if those involved increase the level of awareness of their interdependence

through mutual recognition. In essence, negotiation means that the various people or groups involved recognize they can neither simply impose their will on, nor eliminate the other side, but rather must work with one another to achieve their goals.

This thesis categorizes the Papua conflict as an “ethno-political conflict” in which Papuan ethnic groups make claims on behalf of their collective interests against the state.¹³ The ethnic criteria that the Papuan groups use are not only because they are the Melanesian minority who are distinct from the rest of Indonesians, but more importantly, they share a common descent, historical experience, and cultural traits. They seek equal rights, opportunities, and access to power within existing political power. The claims they make, therefore, include material and political demands, as well as claims arising from their cultural and religious concerns.¹⁴ The strategies that they choose vary from rebellion to demonstrations to an open nonviolent protest in which the state responds with repression and accommodations.

The interrelations among national, local, and international contexts can be explained through the causal relation of the policies and strategic choices made by the Papuan and the GOI in dealing with the conflict. At the same time, international political environments influence the choices of both the Papuans and the GOI.




Figure 4. Interrelation Between Local, National, and International Contexts of the Papua Conflict

¹³ Ted Robert Gurr, “Minorities, Nationalists, and Conflict” in *Managing Global Chaos* (Washington D.C.: USIP Press) 1996, p. 53.

¹⁴ Gurr, *Ibid.*, p. 54.

At first, the responses of the state to the conflict regenerate the attitude and behavior of the Papuan groups that affect their strategies toward the conflict. The ethnic Papuan strategies then influence further policy choices of the state's responses and as such influence the response effect on the Papuan strategies and so forth. The era of globalization of communication and strengthened international human rights advocacy networks cannot be isolated from the policy and strategy choices of both parties. The GOI cannot hide their policies of the ethnic Papuans from the eyes of the international community, especially as Indonesia takes on a higher profile on the international stage as a member of ASEAN, OPEC, APEC, Non-Aligned Countries, etc. Not differently, the Papuan ethnic groups are getting ideas and support, both moral and in the form of materials from the international community for their struggles. Therefore, both parties are sensitive to international political opinions and environments.

Conflict analysis in this thesis will be explored and used as a basis for its resolution frameworks. Analyzing conflict will help to separate the many complex interactions that constitute conflict, to understand the roots of the conflict, and give a reasonable comprehension of the forces that motivate the behavior of all actors¹⁵. Along with Mayer's view, Kriesberg believes that improving the people's understanding of conflict can help them to wage their struggles constructively as well as develop ways to reduce the harm and increase the benefit of conflict¹⁶.

Conflict resolution is a comprehensive term, which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed, and resolved. This implies that behavior is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict has been changed¹⁷. Mayer said¹⁸ that the dimensions of resolution parallel the dimensions of conflict, which are cognitive, emotional, and behavioral. Full resolution of conflict occurs only when there is resolution along all three dimensions. Resolution has many aspects, and a serious conflict is seldom resolved in simple ways. Resolution occurs through a series of different activities, over time, and usually with many setbacks along the way.

¹⁵ Mayer, Ibid.

¹⁶ Kriesberg, Ibid.

¹⁷ Miall, et al., Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁸ Mayer, Ibid.

Lederach¹⁹ argues that all sectors of a society must participate in building peace, with “middle-range” rather than “top-level” leaders having a particularly important role to play, that must be addressed not only for the immediate issues in a conflict but also for the broader systemic and sub-systemic concerns. In other words, progress occurs in stages and peace-building is an ongoing process of interdependent roles, functions, and activities, resources for peace are socio-cultural as well as socioeconomic in nature and the redefinition and restoration of relationships depends on creating a dynamic, conflict-responsive peace-building infrastructure. Lederach also argues that the preparation of people for peace-building endeavors be recast, with emphasis given to a process-oriented and context-responsive approach.

One way to approach reconciliation is as an important meeting point between realism and innovation. A fundamental question is how to create a catalyst for reconciliation and then sustain it in divided societies. There are three assumptions:

- *Relationship* is the basis of both the conflict and its long-term solution. Saunders and Slim argue²⁰ relationships are the focal point for sustained dialogue within protracted conflict settings. Reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups’ affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-in-relationship.
- *Encounter*, not only of people but also of several different and highly interdependent streams of activity. Reconciliation must find ways to address the past without getting locked into a vicious cycle of mutual exclusiveness inherent in the past. People need the opportunity and space to express to, and with, one another the trauma of loss and their grief at that loss, and the anger that accompanies the pain and the memory of injustice experienced.
- *Acknowledgement* through hearing one another’s stories which validates experiences and feelings and represents the first step towards restoration of the person and the relationship. At the same time, reconciliation must envision the future in a way that enhances interdependence. Opportunity must, therefore, be given to people to look forward and envision their shared future. The perspective of native peoples is highly instructive in this respect.

¹⁹ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

²⁰ Harold H. Saunders and Randa Slim, “Dialogue to Change Conflictual Relationships” *Higher Education Exchange* (a Kettering Newsletter) (1994), pp. 43-56.

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II. MICRO ANALYSIS: PAPUA CONFLICT TRIANGLE

A. INTRODUCTION

The conflict in Papua is as complex as its society. The complexity of the conflict involves so many conflicting issues and parties, both at the local and national levels. The Papuan ethno-political groups see the conflict as a struggle for justice, equality, and dignity concerning their traditional rules and costumes. The GOI, on the other hand, sees the struggle of the groups as separatism and considers it a threat to the territorial integrity and stability of the state. Therefore, the GOI tends to resist the demands of the Papuan groups, and instead, has been reacting by imposing a military approach. This response to the situation is described by a Papuan human rights activist, John Rumbiak, as the core of the conflict in Papua:

The main problem is crimes against humanity, widespread and systemic attacks to the civilian. The attacks include murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, and persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds. The Papuans have been victimized of such crimes for years resulting in frustration, disappointment, anger, and helpless.²¹

To have a better understanding of the conflict, the thesis uses Galtung's Conflict Triangle for its analysis. Galtung looks at conflict as a dynamic progress of three components: conflicting issues, attitude, and behavior. The three components formed a triangle with one component in each vertex. The research process of this thesis found that there are three conflicting issues of the Papua conflict: social, economy, and political. While the attitude of the conflicting parties, the GOI and the Papuan ethno-political groups are anger, disappointment, and the resultant distrust. These attitudes can be evidenced by the parties' behaviors, which are hostile and violent.

The triangle of the Papua conflict with some findings about issues for each vertex is presented in Figure 5.

²¹ An interview with The Jakarta Post, 23 April 2003 (available online at http://www.thejakartapost.com/special/os_8_news) (April 2003).




Figure 5. The Papua Conflict Triangle

The following sections will examine each issue shown in Galtung's model, and references can also be made to the application of some of the other models.

B. CONTRADICTION ISSUES

1. Economy

It is undeniable that the Papua Province has benefited from the economic development and prosperity improvements of Indonesia since the Province was integrated into Indonesia in 1969. Overall living conditions in the Province in absolute terms are unquestionably better than they were 40 years ago.²² The economic report of the Province since it became an integral part of Indonesia shows positive progress. Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) at constant 1993 prices in the Province increased from 6.983 to 8.425 (billion *rupiah*) from 1996 to 2000. The number is higher, 8.264 to 20.714 (billion *rupiah*) within Current Market Prices from 1996 to 2000 (BPS Papua Province, 2001).

²² The Council on Foreign Relations, *Ibid.*, p. 24.

Table 1. Comparative Economic Data*. Papua Province-Average Provinces of Indonesia (From: Biro Pusat Statistik, Indonesia, 2001)

	1996	1997	1998	1999**	2000***
Gross Regional Domestic Product at Constant 1993 Prices (in billion rupiah):					
1. Papua Province	6.983	7.502	8.456	8.162	8.425
2. Average Provinces	15.67	16.39	14.49	14.72	15.37
Gross Regional Domestic Product at Current Market Prices (in billion rupiah):					
1. Papua Province	8.264	9.482	19.053	18.249	20.714
2. Average provinces	19.64	22.65	34.20	39.08	44.86
Growth Rate of Gross Regional Domestic Product at Constant 1993 Prices (percent):					
1. Papua Province	13.87	7.42	12.72	(-3.48)	-
2. Average Provinces	8.15	4.49	(-11.67)	1.28	

* Processed Data

** Preliminary Figures

*** Very Preliminary Figures

On the other hand, the total growth rate of GRDP shows a different trend. From 1996 to 2000, the growth rate of the Province decreased from 13.87 to -3.48%. This number is worse than the average growth of Indonesia of 8.15 to 1.28% for the same year. This negative growth of the Province can be explained by the argument, that in relative terms, the Province has not benefited from the economic progress of the rest of Indonesia. The Papua Province is the second poorest province in Indonesia after West Nusa Tenggara.²³ Before the economic crisis in Indonesia in 1998, about 19% of the population (427,000) lived under the poverty line. This thesis assumes that the number is higher since the crisis.

The data on sectoral contributions to the GDRP shows that the biggest contribution comes from the mining sector, 56.10%, with the total amount of 1.71 million *rupiah* followed by the agriculture and defense sectors, respectively 492.14 million *rupiah* and 282.82 million *rupiah*. The smallest contribution is from electricity and water, 13.17 million *rupiah*. The big contribution of the mining sector comes from the mining

²³ United Nations Development Program, *Country Report: Indonesia*, 2002.

operation of PT. Freeport Indonesia, the Indonesian subsidiary of Freeport-McMORAN Copper & Gold Inc. The company, which began operating in Papua in 1967, has been mining the Grasberg ore body in the Mimika *Kabupaten* since 1991, the world's richest gold deposit and third richest copper deposit. This mine produces 222,000 tons of copper per day at the lowest cost in the world²⁴ and with estimated reserves of 50.9 billion pounds of copper and 63.7 million pounds of gold.²⁵ Due to its large-scale operation, Freeport mining is an important economic source for both the Papua Province and Indonesia. To Papua, the mining is the largest employer in Papua and the source of over 56%²⁶ to 70%²⁷ of Papua's GRDP. To the Indonesian national economy, Freeport is Indonesia's single largest taxpayer, contributing an average of \$180 million a year during the period 1991-2001.

In the micro level, urban markets have become a focus of conflict between the settler traders and indigenous Papuan.²⁸ Local police stated that disputes between the settlers and indigenous are common.²⁹ In April 2000, for example, violence occurred when settlers from Bugis-Makasar opened fire on three Papuans with home-made weapons after the latter refused to pay for their meal. The three Papuans and two others were wounded in this accident. Small businesses throughout Papua are dominated by migrants, particularly from the islands of Sulawesi, Java, and Sumatra. Indigenous Papuans, who have been exposed to modern capital and cash economies for barely one generation in most cases, suffer from a severe lack of training and access to capital. The vast majority of Papuans remain marginalized from local economies, living in largely cashless existences of subsistence farming, gathering, and hunting. Increasingly, this exclusion of Papuans from access to cash and commodities is a source of ethnic-based social tension throughout Papua.

²⁴ Council on Foreign Relation, *Ibid.*, p. 51.

²⁵ Denise Leith, *The Politics of Power, Freeport in Suharto's Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003) p. 3.

²⁶ UNDP, *Ibid.*

²⁷ Leith, *Ibid.*, p. 78.

²⁸ ICG, "Ending Repression in Irian Jaya" in *ICG Asia Report*, No. 23, 20 September 2001.

²⁹ An interview with local police, Jayapura, 2002.

On the other hand, the macro economic development and modernization process in the province have come at a price socially, culturally and ecologically which has heightened the conflict. The GOI has stoked local discontent by allowing Papuan natural resources to be overly exploited to the benefit of outsiders. The GOI appears to be unaware that the natural environment is of great importance to the Papua indigenous people. These exploitations damage the environment, the focus of culture and religion of the Papuans. Thus, many Papuans are alienated from the Indonesia government. They do not benefit from the economic development and feel that their indigenous rights and culture are being violated. With regard to the Freeport contribution to the economic development in the province and Indonesia, there are two significant destructive effects of the mining operation. One is the damage to the environment, and the other is the violation of indigenous rights.

Based on Leith's investigation, the problem regarding the destruction of the environment includes the following issues.³⁰

a. Tailing

Tailing is a process for disposing of the residue of the finely ground ore from which precious metals have been extracted into the local river system. At the first, the Freeport operation was discharging 7,000 tpd into the local river system. By mid-1999, the company was disposing of approximately 230,000 tpd, or more than 70 million tons annually. The main issues regarding tailings are the physical destruction to the land, flora and fauna of the area, disputes concerning the quality of the river water, and the proposed reclamation and rehabilitation of the tailing deposition area.

b. Overburden

Overburden is rock that is not processed but must be moved aside during the extraction process so that the mining company can reach the metal-bearing ore. To extract 1.5 grams of gold, the mining process has to move about 5 tons of rock. At currently expected throughput rates, the company predicts that the Grasberg mine will produce more than 4 billion tons of overburden, which will be dumped in surrounding valley and lakes. The two major areas of concern regarding overburden are storage and toxicity.

³⁰ Leith, Ibid., pp. 158-186.

c. Mine Closure

Freeport estimates that by the end of the current mine's life (2041), there will be at least 20 square miles at the mine site and at least 230 miles in the tailings deposition area in the lowlands to be reclaimed and revegetated. The company reaffirms its commitment to the closure process at a cost of \$150 million. However, physical and visual changes to the alpine landscape cannot be reversed. The landscape will have a huge hole filled with copper-impregnated water for at least another hundred years and the short-term and long-term effects underground are still unknown.

The destruction of economic activities has also caused the violation of indigenous rights. The state has often given concessions to resource companies in disregard of the customary rights of the indigenous Papuan communities (ICG, 2002) while the military, especially KOPASSUS, the Military Special Forces, seems to be the main actor in human rights violations in the Province. Therefore, the recent cases for 2000 - 2003 show that BRIMOB (Police Mobile Brigades) has become another actor in the violations or even fighting against KOPASSUS with more civilians as victims. Kopassus and BRIMOB are guarding these concessions and have frequently committed murders and other human rights abuses against civilians. Yet, they compete with each other for the 'security fee' from the companies. In relation to security around the Freeport concession, Leith wrote (2003, p. 3):

For more than thirty years, the American company was able to operate with impunity by adapting to, and indeed, thriving in, a business culture anchored in corruption, collusion, and nepotism. By maintaining a close relationship with the Suharto regime and its feared arm of repression, Freeport secured for itself a powerful political and economic insurance policy

2. Social

The process of economic development in the Papua province, however, has not been accompanied by social development. Therefore, there are so many social problems within the province. This thesis cited the work of the Council on Foreign Relations from their report to the Indonesia Commission: Peace and Progress in Papua.³¹ The majority of the indigenous people of Papua have received neither schooling nor a limited amount of

³¹ The Council on Foreign Relations, Ibid.

grammar school. The literacy rate for women is 44% compared to 78% for the rest of Indonesia, and for men, 58% compared to 90% nationwide. Also, only 10% of Papuans have a high school education and only 1% has graduated from college. The health sector suffers from the same neglect and inadequate resources as education. Papua has only three hospitals, two public and one private. Community health centers in each sub-district are poorly staffed and equipped. Over 20% of the population in the central highlands suffers from malnutrition and vitamin deficiencies. Over 50% of children under the age of five are undernourished, and the infant mortality rate is three times greater in Papua than in the rest of Indonesia. Only 40.8% of children are immunized, compared with a national average of 60.3%. Inadequate primary health care results in fatalities from preventable diseases. Of the infant deaths, 26% are caused by pneumonia, 19% by diarrhea, and 11% by malaria.

Ethnic Papuans are caught between their traditional societies and the compelling forces of modernity. Economic development and changing demographics are exposing ethnic Papuans to the outside world and accelerating Papua's modernization (Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, p. 74). The Papuan indigenous identity was preserved through informal systems of local and religious organizations. The norms and rules that have been developed were usually based upon customary (*adat*) law. The Papua indigenous people, called Papuan, are Melanesian, the same ethnic origin as those in Papua New Guinea and other Melanesian people of the Pacific. They comprise hundreds of tribes and each tribe uses different languages and follows different traditions. They mostly live in rural areas and practice Christianity and animism. The 2001 census of the Papua province found approximately 312 Papuan tribes in the Province with the *Biak Numfor* tribe as the largest, 148,104 people, and the three smallest tribes with 4 people each: *Nalca* and *Pisa* (in Jayawijaya *Kabupaten*) and *Urundi* (in Merauke *Kabupaten*).³² The total amount of indigenous people from 312 tribes is 1,460,846 or 65.41% of the Provincial population in 2000 which was about 2.2 million while the rest are migrants from other provinces of Indonesia who mostly came from Sulawesi, Java, and Maluku. The Provincial population

³² Biro Pusat Statistik Irian Jaya, *Sensus Penduduk Irian Jaya*, 2001.

annual growth rate is 3.22%, higher than the average Indonesian rate of 1.49% but its population density is 6 per square kilometer, the lowest compared to the Indonesian average of 109 per square kilometer.

Table 2. Summary of Important Monograph Data of the Papua Province (From: Population Census (1971, 1980, 1990, 2000) and Inter-Census Population Census (1995))

Monographs Data	1970/71*	1980	1990	1995	2000
1. Total Population	923,440	1,173,875	1,648,708	1,942,627	2,220,934
2. Population Growth Rate**	-	2.67	3.46	-	3.22
3. Population Density per Square Km.	2	3	4	5	6
4. Total Fertility Rate	7.195	5.350	4.701	3.15	2.96
5. Life Time Migration	33,513	93,030	261,308	319,276	-
6. Net Migrants	27,064	77,741	230,544	226,920	800,000***

* The origin dates were vary from 1970 to 1971 but since Indonesia does Population Census every 10 year, I assumed that the data is same between 1970 and 1971

** The original data was average annual from 1971-1980, 1980-1990, and 1990-2000

*** The data of 2000 is taken from UNDP Jakarta, Indonesia

The data from 1971 to 1995 showed that the net migration to the province has increased steadily. The migration has changed the ethnic composition of the population in the Province. The GOI started the transmigration program to the Province in the 1980's. Transmigration is a government program to resettle inhabitants of densely populated regions of Indonesian provinces, mostly the provinces in the Java, Madura, and Bali islands, to the sparsely populated regions of the provinces in Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi Island, and Papua. To accommodate these new arrivals, called *transmigran*, authorities often relocated indigenous communities from their traditional lands (Council on Foreign Relations, 2003).

The transmigration program has been accused of being the cause of social problems (Leith, 2003, pp. 204-214) especially around the Freeport site. While Freeport has not been directly involved in bringing the *transmigran*, either sponsored by the Government or spontaneous to the area, the mining company's presence is the magnet, and its employment practices, its willingness to purchase the *transmigrans'* produce, and

its ability to provide education and health facilities have ensured the longevity of these settlements. On the other hand, the Papuans see the settlements as an integral component of the central government policy designed to destroy the Melanesian culture. The component of attitude in the triangle conflict is prejudice. They suspect that the presence of the *transmigran* is to undermine the Papuans' traditional values, their spiritual and economic claim to their traditional lands, and to destroy the social fabric of the indigenous community.

Table 3 shows that the indigenous Papuan people (65.41%) mostly live in rural and remote areas in small villages where they practice Christianity and animism (Others in Table 3), while the migrants are settled in cities in the *kabupaten*, *kotamadya*, and *kecamatan*, and practicing other 'legal' religions of Indonesia (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism).³³ The Dani tribe with a population of nearly 400,000 was discovered only when a plane first flew over the Baliem Valley in 1938. The International Crisis Group (ICG, 2001) noted that migrants from other provinces dominate both the civil service and the local economy in the Papua Province. These changing demographics have dramatically increased the wealth disparities and social tensions in the region.

Obviously, there are more than 300 tribes in Papua and each has their own traditions and customs. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize the traditional customs and laws of the Papuans, though it can be said that most of the traditions and customs of the indigenous people of Papua recognize the spiritual bond between the people and their land. Social organization in a traditional Papuan society is commensurate with 'kin-ordered', and political authority in the local community is manifested in the form of the Big Man³⁴ who must:

demonstrate that he possesses the kinds of skills that command respect – magical powers, gardening prowess, mastery of oratorical style, perhaps bravery in war and feud. Typically decisive is the deployment of one's skills and efforts in a certain direction: towards amassing goods ... and distributing them in ways which build a name for cavalier generosity...³⁵

³³ The Indonesia Government only recognized five religions: Islam, Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Budha. In 2000, President Wahid tried to add one more, Khong Hoe Tju.

³⁴ Dale Gietzeld, *Indonesia in West Papua: the Dynamic of Indonesianization* (Thesis Research: University of Sydney, 1985), p. 12.

³⁵ Sahlins in Gietzeld, Ibid.

Table 3. Percentage of Indigenous People and Their Religions. (From: BPS Papua Province, 2001)

Religions	Population		Indigenous People		Percentage Indigenous People to Population
	Amount	%	Amount	%	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
URBAN					
1. Islam	246.836	42.55	14.960	7.61	6,06
2. Catholic	50.387	8.69	18.607	9.46	36,93
3. Protestant	279.069	48.10	162.365	82.57	58,18
4. Hindu	1.569	0.27	43	0.02	2,74
5. Budha	1.110	0.19	38	0.02	3,42
6. Others	1.160	0.20	638	0.32	55,00
Totals	580.131	100.00	196.651	100.00	33,90
RURAL					
1. Islam	314.476	19.02	36.583	2.89	11,63
2. Catholic	327.984	19.84	288.775	22.84	88,05
3. Protestant	1.007.407	60.93	938.085	74.20	93,12
4. Hindu	2.019	0.12	105	0.01	5,20
5. Budha	489	0.03	45	0.00	9,20
6. Others	1.024	0.06	602	0.05	58,79
Totals	1.653.399	100.00	1.264.195	100.00	76.46
URBAN+RURAL					
1. Islam	561.312	25.13	51.543	3.53	9,18
2. Catholic	378.371	16.94	307.392	21.04	81,24
3. Protestant	1.286.476	57.60	1.100.450	75.33	85,54
4. Hindu	3.588	0.16	148	0.01	4,12
5. Budha	1.599	0.07	83	0.01	5,19
6. Others	2.184	0.10	1.240	0.08	56,78
TOTALS	2.233.530	100.00	1.460.846	100.00	65,41

A similar form of authority occurs in Papua where political power in the wider community is engendered through alliances. The indigenous people of Papua have established and maintained sophisticated methods of garden cultivation, including in some cases, elaborate irrigation systems. Yet, because no centralized, institutional authority exists in the Western sense, Papuan social and political structures have been paternalistically dismissed as ‘primitive’ and attempts have thus been made by Christian missionaries to convert them.

3. Political Issues

The root of the polemic started in 1949 when The Netherlands ceded independence to its former territories, The Dutch East Indies or Indonesia, except West

New Guinea. After short periods of occupation by Japan in 1942 and then the Allied Forces administration in 1945, the province was returned to the Dutch government in January 1946, and in 1949, the Dutch issued a decree which declared Papua their overseas province.

In the meantime, Indonesia fought a long revolutionary war against Dutch colonization for more than 350 years. In 1945, just two days after Japan surrendered to the Allied Force, Indonesia declared its independence. However, it was not until 1949 when the Dutch finally acknowledged Indonesia's sovereignty and agreed to withdraw its troops and officials from the Indonesian archipelago, except from Papua. A prolonged diplomatic campaign ensued between the Dutch administration and Indonesia after that time.³⁶ Indonesia's struggle to win back Papua was supported by 29 countries that participated in the Asia Africa Conference in 1955. The Dutch, however, ignored the call and instead continued to govern Papua as a separate colony justifying this financially and diplomatically costly enterprise on the grounds that they were preparing the Papuans for self-rule.³⁷ The promise to liberate Papua as a new independent country will be used later by the pro-independence organization to justify their movement.

Indonesia, on the other hand, protested and struggled to have Papua as part of its national territory. To counter the Netherlands decolonization policy, the new government of Indonesia under President *Soekarno* declared TRIKORA (*Tri Komando Rakyat*, People Three Commands) in December 1961. The Three Commands were:

- Prevent the establishment of the Papua State made in The Netherlands.
- Raise 'the red and white', Indonesian national flag, in Papua
- Prepare for general mobilization to defend the independence and unity of Indonesia.

The Three Commands movement worked to the political advantage of Indonesia. The United States heavily pressured the Dutch and brokered an agreement transferring administrative authority for Papua from The Netherlands to the United Nations.

³⁶ The Jakarta Post, Ibid.

³⁷ Octavianus Mote and Danilyn Rutherford, *From Irian Jaya to Papua: The Limits of Primordialism in Indonesia's Troubled East*, (2001). pp. 117-118. Available online at [http://anulib.anu.edu.au/sasi.new/search.php?com_serName=68&txt_nm=200&in=3748] (November 2003)

The UN temporary administration worked under the terms of the 1962 New York Agreement. In Article 18, the 1962 New York Agreement specified that “Indonesia will make arrangements with the assistance and participation of the United Nations for giving Papuans the opportunity to choose between independence and integration into Indonesia.” After the agreement was signed, the UN and Indonesian representatives continuously discussed how the Act of Self-Determination should be executed. The UN favored the ‘one man one vote’ system, but Indonesia did not want to do so and favored a ‘representative vote’. Indonesia argued that the ‘one man one vote’ system would be difficult to execute in the geographical and population context of Papua. Finally, on August 15, 1969, a group of 1,025 tribal leaders voted to join Indonesia.³⁸ Indonesia announced to the world that the act of free choice was final, legal, and irrevocable as Article 17 of the New York Agreement was implemented whereby the representative councils of Papua were consulted on the appropriate procedures and methods to ascertain the will of the people. All the Papuan representatives decided, unanimously on behalf of the people of Papua, to remain with Indonesia.³⁹ This process of voting created controversial circumstances in which pro-independence movements raised questions.⁴⁰

C. ATTITUDINAL ISSUES

This paper presents the Papua Box⁴¹ as an example of how the Papuans and the GOI perceive both issues and attitude towards each other. There were also many statements made by the police that exposed underlying attitudes of discrimination and racism, such as: “Wamena people are the equivalent of animals”; You (Wamena) are all like dogs and pigs...”⁴² as shown in the sub-section of behavioral issues in the following pages.

³⁸ Mote and Rutherford, *Ibid*.

³⁹ Indonesia Mission, 2002. See more detail Questions and Answer about the Facts on Indonesia’s Sovereignty Over Irian Jaya in [<http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/humanright/irianjaya.htm>]. (August 2003)

⁴⁰ See Mote and Rutherford, 2001; Saltford, 2000; and Lunn, 1999.

⁴¹ Cited from the Peace Journalism Workshop material, Internews, Indonesia, 2000.

⁴² Human Rights Watch, *Press Release* by ELSHAM, 14 December 2001.

Table 4. The Papua Box

Important Facts that Are Urgent for Papua	How the GOI Perceives the Important Facts of Papua
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is our land. • This land belongs to Papuan ancestor. • All of Papuan natural resources are ours • Culture and our religion are threatened. • It is our right to get independence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • They have chosen to be part of Indonesia and they did it freely. • Primitive outlook as an excuse. • Their selfish attitude breaks the law • The culture and religion of Papuan cuts off the development. • We have given them broad autonomy under the Republic of Indonesia.
Important Facts that Are Urgent for the GOI	How the Papua Perceives the Important Facts of the GOI
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We are one nation. • All of Indonesian natural resources belong to Indonesian society. • We have to defend Papua for local and national security. • We have to provide shelter for densely populated regions of other Indonesian provinces. • All Indonesians have the right to live in a modern state where inter-cultural and inter-religion practices take place. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We did not intend to be part of Indonesia, the 'Act of Free Choice' was a mockery. • They have stolen our natural resources. • Local and national security is not our business. • They try to marginalize us with bringing non-Papuans in. • They do not leave us to live our own ways.

D. BEHAVIOR ISSUES

This thesis found that the parties of the Papua conflict have shown hostile and violent behavior toward each other. This stems from a series of repressive responses of the Indonesian security forces toward the Papuans. This part of the thesis examines two related cases of political violence involving the Indonesian police and the Papuan

indigenous people. These cases are linked in important respects, including the rage against the “*Wamena* people” expressed by police officers responsible for some of the worst human rights abuses in these cases. The two cases happened in *Wamena* and *Abepura*, towns 400 kilometers apart, in October and December 2000, respectively. *Wamena* is the largest town in the central highlands of Papua with a population of over 100,000. *Abepura*, a college town near the provincial capital of *Jayapura* has more than one million residents.

Throughout the Papua province, the Papuan ethno-political movements have been erecting simple community centers called POSKO where residents gather to discuss political events and matters of public interest. The central focus of these movements often features the display of the Papuan Morning Star flag that was going to be banned by the Indonesian authorities after a meeting with President Wahid on 19 October 2000. On 3 October 2002, the Papuan leaders claimed that they had won a delay after discussions with the police chief and the provincial authorities.⁴³ However, three days later, on 6 October, the provincial authorities launched a series of joint security forces (army and police) coordinated raids on at least seven POSKO in and around *Wamena* aimed at suppressing the flag. Flagpoles were chain-sawed and the flags torn up or confiscated. Dozens of Papuans were arrested, ten were shot and at least one killed in the raids.⁴⁴ As news of the raid spread, a large crowd gathered to defend the flag in *Wouma*, a village near *Wamena*. In an unexplained circumstance, two migrants were murdered in *Wouma*. Later, the crowd took to the streets to protest, burning and looting shops as they went. Troops arrived and opened fire in the air and ground to disperse the crowd and then withdrew in the direction of the town, followed by the angry Papuans in hot pursuit. Shots were fired at the crowd from the nearby migrant residential neighborhood, which resulted in the crowd attacking the migrants’ homes and the inhabitants. At least seven Papuans were shot and killed and 24 non-Papuan were killed in the incident.⁴⁵

⁴³ Joe Sanders, “Violence and Political Impasse in Papua” *Human Rights Watch: Asia Division Report*, July 2001, Vol. 13, No. 2.

⁴⁴ Sanders, *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Subsequently, continuing protests and violence were carried out by the indigenous Papuans against the state authority throughout Papua. On 7 October 2000, another incident started in the college town of *Abepura*. An “unidentified group” attacked the police station of *Abepura* at 1:30 in the morning, causing the deaths of two policemen and one security guard, wounding two other policemen and setting three shops on fire.⁴⁶ The perpetrators escaped to the hills. The BRIMOB (a mobilized security force) and police suspected the “unidentified group” was *Wamena*’s group. Therefore, in response they raided the students’ dormitories where students from *Wamena* mainly live. Twenty-three students from *Wamena* were taken into custody and immediately the police began to brutally beat them. Within 24 hours, the security force had swept two other highlander school dorms and four highlander residential areas. The police began beating the detainees immediately, even in broad daylight with crowds of onlookers. The beating continued for another 36 hours while in police custody. By the end of the security force raids over 100 people had been detained, one student killed, and two students beaten to death while in custody. The majority of the over 100 detainees reported severe beatings and torture, and many suffered serious injuries.

The local leaders of the Papuans had been subjected to repression in one form or another from the security forces for some time. Aside from the previous arguments over the display of the Papuan flag, there was no established liaison relationship between the Papuan leaders and the provincial police or governmental bodies. From a review of the subsequent literature, it appears that no initiation of any formal liaison between the civilian leaders and the authorities has been attempted since the incident. In January 2001, Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission announced that it would appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate the case. The *Abepura* case was expected to be one of the first cases considered for trial under the country’s relatively new human rights court laws.⁴⁷ The case became the subject of a very high profile investigation. Upon completion of the investigation, the independent commission issued a strong report

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Saunders, Ibid.

naming 26 police officers as suspects in human rights abuses. To date no actual charges have been filed, and the actual prosecution of these suspects continues to remain doubtful.⁴⁸

E. CONCLUSION

The micro analysis of the root causes of the Papua conflict shows that the conflict has appeared in a full round of the Conflict Triangle. The conflict in Papua becomes an exchange of hostile behavior, grounded in mutually hostile attitudes, over some political, social, and economic issues. Therefore, as Galtung says, the conflict resolution must involve a set of dynamic changes that include a de-escalation of conflict behavior, a change in attitude, and transformation in the relationship or clashing interests at the core of the conflict structure. The conflicting political, social and economic issues have worked as mobilizing factors that overlap with the Papuan ethnic identity. The Papuan ethno-political groups then used this as a basis for political actions.

Politically, the Papuan indigenous people representation in the provincial government administration, such as courts, military, police, political parties, and other political institutions, is low. The legitimacy of Indonesia's system as a whole then falls into question. Therefore, Papuan ethno-nationalism has a chance to emerge as a response to the inability of the existing institutions to fulfill the people's basic needs as there are no alternative structures available. Economically, the Papuan indigenous people see the practice of unfairness in economic opportunities as the migrants almost dominate the economic sector and have better access to economic resources such as capital and land. They also see the migrant's different standard of living as unacceptable. Also, socially, the transmigration process, both government sponsored and spontaneous, has created negative impacts such as a disruption in the traditional social system and values, and undermining of traditional political institutions.

At the same time, the escalating political violence in the Papua province presents a difficult challenge for future attempts to resolve the conflict. Thus far, the Indonesian government's legal and police responses to the Papuan ethno-political movements have not only produced more violent behavior but also created a political impasse. Although

⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002: Indonesia, 10 November 2003 [http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/07/papua0703.htm]. (November 2003)

the Indonesian police were separated from the military in 2000, they persist in displaying their military mentality and continue to use terror as a tactic to quash pro-independence supporters. Leaders of peaceful pro-independence factions in Papua are being charged with rebellion and spreading hatred. The practice of indiscriminately targeting nonmilitant community members using “guilty by association” tactics also continues to antagonize civilians resulting in further hatred and angry attitudes and reducing the trust between the people and government agencies.

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III. MACRO ANALYSIS: THE CONTEXTS OF PAPUA CONFLICT

A. INTRODUCTION

This part of the thesis analyzes the macro contexts of conflict in the Papua province. There are three contexts that will be analyzed: national (domestic), local (provincial), and international. This thesis argues that the three contexts of national, local, and international are interrelated and determine the conflict situation and lead to the escalation and (or) de-escalation of the conflict. The interrelation among national, local, and international contexts can be explained through the causal relation of the policy and strategy choices made by the Papuan and the GOI in dealing with the conflict. At the same time, the international political environment influences the choices of both the Papuan and the GOI.

At first, the state policies toward the Papua province will influence the Papuan ethno-political groups and generate specific attitudes and behaviors of the groups to the state. This can be seen through the groups' strategies that tend towards escalation and (or) de-escalation of the conflict. The groups' strategies then further influence the responses of the state and further regenerate as well the state's policy choices with the possible effect of escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. This inter-causal loop will go around and shape the dynamic of the conflict. The era of communication globalization and stronger international human rights advocacy networks, however, cannot be isolated from this loop. The GOI cannot hide their policies toward the ethnic Papuan from the eyes of the international community especially as Indonesia acquires a higher profile on the international stage as a member of ASEAN, OPEC, APEC, Non-Aligned Countries, etc. Not surprisingly, the Papuan ethnic groups are getting ideas and moral and material support for their struggle from the international communities. Therefore, both parties are sensitive to international political opinions and environments.

The interrelation among the three contexts can be described in Figure 6⁴⁹.




Figure 6. Interrelation between Local, National, and International Contexts of the Papua Conflict

National Context examines the policies of the central GOI to encourage Papuan ethnic mobilization and the dynamic of the conflict. The analysis of this context will answer the following questions: has the GOI been able to establish a surrogate Melanesian administration that supports the central government? Why did the GOI have such difficulty in becoming the organization in the society that effectively established an acceptable administration for the Papuan indigenous people? How does the GOI perceive the demands of the indigenous people of Papua? How does the GOI policy affect the Papua conflict?

Local Context examines the underlying local condition of the Papua province that drives ethnic mobilization, the actors and their strategies of the Papuan ethnic groups who demand more local autonomy and power sharing; and their reaction to the policies of the GOI. The major questions on this context are: Why do the indigenous people of Papua demand independence from Indonesia? What do they mean by independence? What are their interests, needs, and strategies? What are their strengths and weaknesses?

International Context examines the international political environments that help shape the aspirations, opportunities, and strategies of Papuan ethno-political groups; and, at the same time, affect the policies of the GOI toward the conflict. More details

⁴⁹ This diagram has been developed from Gurr, "Minorities, Nationalists, and Conflict" in *Managing Global Chaos* (Washington D.C.: USIP Press) 1996, p. 64.

about international engagements need to be addressed here. Which international political environments matter? How do they see the conflict? What are the likely supports or actions that they could do to solve the conflict?

B. THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

The analysis of the national context examines Indonesia's political institutions and capabilities that influence the strategic choices, both the objectives and the means to do so, of the Papua ethno-political groups. The Minorities at Risk study points to the significance of three factors in the state context: the scope of state power; the political values and practices of an institutionalized democracy; and the transient effects of democratization.⁵⁰

According to Gurr⁵¹, state power is a durable opportunity factor. Strong states are those that have ample resources and the administrative and political capacity to control or regulate most economic, social, and political activities. Democratic institutions and elites are the other durable opportunity factors that weigh heavily in the strategic calculations of ethno-nationalists. Transition to a democracy and its regime that wants to establish a more participatory and responsive political system poses problematic consequences for ethnic mobilization and conflict. Therefore, a successful democratization process in Indonesia has to be able to establish the more democratic regime in which ethnic and other interests are accommodated by peaceful means. The process of transition also creates threatening uncertainties for the elites, ethnic political groups, and other interest groups both at the national and local levels.⁵²

Indonesia's state power has a long history from the earliest process of Indonesia's state making right after it gained recognition as an independent state from the Dutch colonists in 1949 to the present new democratic regime after the fall of the military authoritarian regime of the New Order. The earliest process of state making of Indonesia followed the definition of Cohen and colleagues as a "primitive central state power

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* No. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 12-34.

accumulation”⁵³ in which the state expands and consolidates its territorial and demographic domain under a political authority, maintains order over the population in the territory, and extracts resources from the territory and the population under the control of the state to support state policies and to maintain the apparatuses of the state to continue routine administration, deepen the state’s penetration of society, and serve symbolic purposes. The central state accumulation of power was growing stronger as the New Order regime under General Soeharto took over leadership and deposed Soekarno from his presidential seat in 1965.

Barbara Geddes classified the New Order regime as intermediate military authoritarian⁵⁴ while the Council on Foreign Relation classified it as a virtual single-party rule with a strong view for the need of a nationwide security presence and centralization of power and wealth.⁵⁵ The New Order regime that seized power in 1965 to 1998 had governed state-society relations with the main task of exercising very centralized control and within a single identity to maintain order and stability over the Indonesia’s provinces. As Geddes argues, the military regime greatly values the territorial integrity of the nation and internal order, but they feel unable to pursue these goals effectively unless the military itself remains unified and adequately supplied.⁵⁶ Therefore, the Indonesian military doctrine of Dual Function served as a basic argument to the military intervention in almost all sectors of public life, including businesses, mostly to finance the needs of the military for modern weaponry and high-quality recruitment. In the case of Papua, the military has received regular financing for the “government-provided security” from the biggest mining company that has operated in the province, PT. Freeport, since 1967. In 2001, the military received a total of USD 4.7 million and USD 5.6 million in 2002. These amounts did not include USD 35 million that has been spent by the company to build housing, offices, and other facilities for the military that involve over 2,000

⁵³ Yousef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A.F.K. Organski, “The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order,” in *American Political Science Review* 75, No. 4 (1981).

⁵⁴ Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?” in *Annual Review of Political Science*, No. 2 (1999) p. 124.

⁵⁵ The Council on Foreign Relations, *Indonesia Commission: Peace and Progress in Papua* (New York: CFR Inc.) 2003, p. 5.

⁵⁶ Geddes, *Ibid.*, p. 126.

personnel over a period of several years.⁵⁷ For the military, this financial resource is a big deal as the government of Indonesia can only cover 30% of the total military budget.⁵⁸ Therefore, in addition to maintaining the integrity and territory, the military is keen to keep their presence in the province to gain economic revenues.

Ironically, since the Papua province became an integral part of Indonesia in 1969, the Indonesian state has not been able to establish state legitimacy over the province. Instead, it seems fragile.⁵⁹ Charles Barber shows⁶⁰ that over the past three decades the New Order regime has systematically exploited Papua's abundant natural resources to support rapid economic growth, social service expansion, and state capacity rather than local development. The economic development in the province has been characterized by large-scale projects such as mining and logging concessions with the hope that the industrialization programs will regenerate other development programs based on the province's abundant natural resources. The Indonesia central government hoped that the industry-based development would regenerate social and political development in the province. Basic social services for Papuans provided some benefits, but fell behind the rest of Indonesia, especially in Papua's rural areas. The Council on Foreign Relations finds that Papua's educational and health infrastructures are incapable of servicing the local populations. Still, the Indonesia state has succeeded in maintaining the three state accumulation power activities over the province by monopolizing and concentrating the means of coercion and force.

Enhanced capacities have enabled the state to extend its political, territorial, and ideological control. At the same time, the state has used its heightened political capacities, and the benefits of development, to muffle long-standing divisions within Indonesian society and quell recent local conflicts arising from rapid socioeconomic and environmental changes. Also, the state security forces of the military and police have

⁵⁷ *Joyo Indonesia News*, 05 December 2003.

⁵⁸ Stanley A. Weiss, "Send the Military to Business School," *International Herald Tribune*, 19 September 2002.

⁵⁹ International Crisis Group.

⁶⁰ Charles Victor Barber, "The Case Study of Indonesia," *Project in Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity, and Civil Violence*, 1997, Section I, p. 2. Available online at: [http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/state/indon/indon1.htm]. (August 2003)

been successfully localized and suppressed the conflict with the argument of maintaining state territory and integrity. Obviously, many cases exist in which the security force's action leads to the violation of the indigenous people's rights and human rights abuses as explored in Chapter II.

Barber's case study⁶¹ found that the proliferation of the Papuan conflict over natural resources depresses the legitimacy, coherence, and reach of the Indonesian state at the local level. A number of factors have produced this conflict. The worsening local scarcities of natural resources have severely affected the well-being of the indigenous people of Papua who are traditionally dependent on hunting, fishing, and farming. It has also provoked an increasingly aggressive rent-seeking behavior by elites and capitalist interests. Simultaneously, rapid socio-political change in Indonesia has created activist groups ready to challenge the state and the rent-seeking behavior of elites. This change has also provided avenues of protest, and audiences for protest, often overseas, that were previously unavailable. Finally, the Indonesian state has a generally low capacity to generate and deliver new and reformed institutions at both the local and national levels. This low capacity is, in turn, a function of several things, such as institutional inertia arising from the historical origins of the modern Indonesian state, the state's efforts to undermine the traditional community institution, and resources to co-opt and bribe potential opponents. A widening gap between rising demands on the state and the state's actual performance, in turn, erodes the state's legitimacy, further aggravates conflicts among elites, and sharpens disputes between the elites and masses. As the state weakens, the social balance of power can shift in favor of groups challenging state authority.⁶²

The political reform of the Indonesian state from a military authoritarian regime to a developing democratic regime in 1998 seems to bring new hope for a better approach to the Papua conflict. The national leaders of the post New Order regime have showed new intensities and increased civilian capacities for responding to the Papua conflict. They are more likely to follow policies of recognition, pluralism, and group autonomy. The year following the reform represented the height both of the consolidation of the

⁶¹ Barber, *Ibid.*

⁶² Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 103.

political movement of the Papuan ethno-political groups and of government tolerance for their non-violent political actions. Their policies, however, have been uncertain and inconsistent. It seems that the post-New Order governments

have had difficulty in formulating new policies of regional governance in Papua province that are compatible with national ideals for democratizing the political system. This challenge has become more acute since the separation of East Timor heightened fears of the disintegration of the state.⁶³

The governments of Presidents Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati recognized the deep suffering of the Papuan people from political repression, human rights abuses, and economic exploitation during the previous era of President Suharto and apologized for that suffering. Habibie and Wahid established dialogues with the Papuan leaders and followed them up with various accommodative policies and tolerant attitudes while the recent President Megawati committed her government to a new policy framework that would not only respect the cultural identities and special characteristics of the people, but also give the provincial government wider authority to manage its own affairs in the form of special autonomy.⁶⁴ In November 2001, the Indonesia's People Legislative Council (MPR) passed the legislation of "Special Autonomy" for the Papua province that grants the province local control over natural resources and provides significant power to the local government and guarantees for the cultural and religious rights to the indigenous people of Papua. The Papuans have high expectations about the "Special Autonomy" law as it will guarantee the attainment of their demands. The law had also convinced them that their best place to be is within the unitary state of Indonesia.

Unfortunately, in 2003, before the government implemented the Special Autonomy law, President Megawati issued a presidential instruction to divide the Papua province into three provinces. The issue in the Megawati presidential instruction is not new as on 16 September 1999, the Indonesian parliament passed Law No. 45 mandating the division of the Papua province into three provinces. On 12 October, President Habibie issued Presidential Decree No. 327, appointing two other Papuans as the new governors. However, both Law No. 45 and Presidential Decree No. 327 were never implemented

⁶³ International Crisis Group, *Ibid.*, p. ii.

⁶⁴ International Crisis Group, *Ibid.*, p. i.

following the transfer of the presidency from Habibie to Wahid. On issuing the instruction, the central government of Indonesia did not consult with the Papuan leaders and has never explained the purpose of the instruction. As a result, this new presidential instruction has increased the Papuan's resentment and distrust toward the central government of Indonesia and, at the same time, it becomes the new source of conflict among the Papuans, especially for those who support and oppose the instruction.

On the other hand, the heavy handed actions of military repression have charged many human rights abuses and resulted in an escalation of Papuan grievances and support for the guerilla resistances; and increased international awareness. While the OPM's attacks never threaten Indonesian control over the province, their continuing struggles have been able to maintain the idea of separatism. Also, this idea can serve as a trigger for more militaristic counter insurgency responses leading to civilian casualties and human rights abuses.

C. LOCAL (PROVINCIAL) CONTEXT

This part of the thesis examines the local contexts of the Papuan ethno-political actions. This relates to the most obvious characteristic of the Indonesian government for decades which is centralistic administration and policies. The local provincial government, including Papua, serves the interests of the central government more rather than those of the local people. All of its policies are "top-down" from the national to the provincial level. The local government of the Papua province is a worse case scenario as the majority of its employees are non-Papuans who are appointed by the central government. In addition, most of them feel that their appointments are "punishment" as the central government has placed them in a less developed and less civilized society. Not surprisingly, they feel a very thin bond with the province and its local people as they work in the province only to do their "duty." Therefore, the Papuan indigenous people feel they have no representation of their local interests in the provincial government. In this case, the legitimacy of the local government of the Papua province is as fragile as the central government of Indonesia toward the indigenous people of Papua. This factor then determines the nature, intensity, and persistence of the Papuan ethno-political actions.

According to Gurr, there are four factors that determine the nature, intensity, and persistence of the indigenous people's political actions⁶⁵.

- The salience of an ethno-cultural identity for members and leaders of the group.
- The extent to which the group has collective incentives for ethno-political action.
- The extent of the group's capacities for collective action.
- The availability of opportunities in the group's political environment that increases its chances of attaining group objectives through political action.

The following section will examine the four factors just mentioned in the context of the local Papua province.

1. The Salience of Ethno-Cultural Identity

The proposition of this factor is that the greater the salience of the ethno-cultural identity for people who share a common descent, cultural traits, and historical experiences, the more likely they are to define their interests in ethno-cultural terms. It will also be easier for the leaders to mobilize them for collective action.⁶⁶

The indigenous people of Papua are Melanesian who share more common characteristics with other indigenous people in the Pacific instead of the rest of Indonesia. There are more than 300 tribes within the Papuan indigenous people. However, there is a sense of “one group of Papuans” as their traditions and customs recognize the spiritual bond between the people and their land. Social organization in traditional Papuan society, commensurate within the ‘kin-ordered’ and political authority in the local community, is manifested in the form of local traditional leaders. For Papuans, the affiliation as “one” Papuan provides a sense of security, the feeling and condition that they did not have from the GOI, especially from the Indonesian security forces of the police and military. The “one Papuan” can be a source of trust, certainty, reciprocal help, and protection against the neglect of one’s interests by outsiders.⁶⁷ Obviously, the Papuans are living in one

⁶⁵ Gurr, Ibid., pp. 167-173.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 66.

⁶⁷ Horowitz, p. 49.

geographic area which is in the Papua province. Therefore, their strong sense as “one Papuan” can easily create “Papuan Nationalism”⁶⁸ in which they have their own anthem and flag despite their local language.

At the same time, this thesis also recognizes the material interests of Papuan activism, such as the right to control Papua’s natural resources and provide more opportunities to local people to participate in the local government. In doing so, the Papuan ethno-political decisive factor is that they organize their shared identity and seek gains or to redress grievances for their collectivity.

2. Incentives for Ethno-Political Action

The general proposition is that the greater the shared incentives among members of an ethno-cultural identity group, the more likely they are to support and participate in ethno-political actions. Ethno-political actions refer to any organized activity in pursuit of the group’s objectives, beginning with mobilization, the process by which people are recruited into movements. The range of actions includes conventional politics, collective action (strike, demonstrations, non-violent direct action), and rebellion (terrorism, armed uprising, guerilla wars, civil wars).

The actions of Papuan ethno-political groups vary from rebellion to open nonviolent protests. About 10 to 20 small uncoordinated guerilla groups, called the Free Papua Movement (OPM), have waged a low-intensity campaign against Indonesian rule since the 1960’s. The OPM is actually shorthand for several armed rebel groups, scattered in jungles across the expansive territory. They have no link to one another but they have the same goal: wage a low-intensity campaign against Indonesian rule.⁶⁹ They can be categorized as low-level-insurgencies characterized by sporadic fighting against the Indonesian Military (TNI), mostly along the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border. However, they never threatened Indonesian control over the Papua province. The TNI identifies the OPMs as separatist groups. The OPMs and their supporters have a fundamental mind-set that the Papuans are a separate racial, cultural, religious, and

⁶⁸ International Crisis Group, *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

⁶⁹ The Council on Foreign Relations, *Ibid.*

geographic entity, and thus deserving of their own nation state status. The guerilla resistances of the OPM, however, were more effective in keeping alive the ideal of independence than in ever threatening Indonesia's control over the province.⁷⁰

During the last five years, the Papuans have also chosen another strategy in which the Papuan leaders are advocating independence with demonstrations and peaceful campaigns from rural to urban areas. They formed a pro-independence political body in June 2000, namely the Papuan Presidium Council (DPP). The DPP is a pro-independence political body with political actions that pursue protest and lobbying-type methods to influence Indonesian central government policies for the advancement of the Papuan administrative and cultural autonomy. The Council on Foreign Relations has claimed that the DPP is the single most widely accepted and inclusive body representing the aspirations of ethnic Papuans.⁷¹ To advocate its non-violent struggle, the DPP raises funds from a variety of community-based organizations, activist organizations, and corporate interests.

3. Capacity for Ethno-Political Action

The general proposition is that the greater the cohesion and mobilization of an ethno-cultural identity group, the more frequent and sustained its participation in political action. Mobilization as a process refers to the ways in which members of ethno-political organizations are recruited and motivated.

The members of the Papuan ethno-political groups consist of elite and grass-root people. The Papuan elites are bureaucratic elites. They are mostly in the senior and middle positions of the provincial and district government, the churches, institutes of higher education, and NGOs.⁷² They also become the leaders of Papuan society especially during political transition periods. The older elites were Dutch educated while the remainder are Indonesian educated. Therefore, they become the accommodator agents for both the Dutch government of the past and the Indonesian of the present. The dominant mode of the elite's accommodation is borne out of a pragmatic acceptance and

⁷⁰ International Crisis Group "Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya", *ICG Asia Report*, No. 23, 20 September 2001.

⁷¹ The Council on Foreign Relations, "Indonesia Commission: Peace and Progress in Papua" in *Report of an Independent Commission*, 2003, p. 105.

⁷² Ibid., p. 9.

opportunity for economic, political, and social development of the province. The senior churchmen, for example, become agents, mediators, and peacemakers for the Indonesian government. They were motivated by their sense of responsibility to protect their flock against what they perceived to be the overwhelming force that the Indonesian authority was able to mobilize.⁷³ Another motivation of the Papuan elites is to act to secure the continuation of Papuan society. This motive can be seen in the statement of the present Papua Governor, Jacobus Solossa, in his interview with the Nederland Radio: Indonesia Broadcast on 4 December 2000. He stated:

Do not incite our people to demand independence. It has to be explained that Indonesia would not accept the demand that easily. There would be many complex problems and our people would be the casualties. We must explain clearly and see with clarity so that we do not behave emotionally. [If not] our people will become the victims. Who will be responsible for the people?⁷⁴

In the meantime, the Papuan leaders have successfully educated and mobilized grass-roots people with Papuan idealism broadly and deeply in the Papuan society, from urban areas to remote villages. This success of mobilization can be seen from the people participating in the Papuan Congress.

4. Opportunities and Choices

The ways in which identity, incentives, and capacity are translated into ethno-political action depend on aspects of political and cultural context that are difficult to summarize in a general manner. However, most ethno-political actions, including all sustained campaigns of protest and rebellion, are shaped by strategic assessments and tactical decisions of the leaders and activists of politically mobilized communal groups.

The fall of the military-authoritarian regime of the New Order in 1998, weakened the centralistic state of Indonesia. It made the Papuan indigenous people more assertive and aware of their rights. This opportunity gives and influences indigenous leaders to evolve their ethnic identity into a political ideology. They are increasingly laying claim to power, resources or status in terms of the indigenous belief system (*adat*). *Adat* is likely to be a growing influence in the relationship between the Indonesian state and the

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Radio Nederland Siaran Indonesia in ICG, Ibid., p. 10.

Papuans. A statement by the *adat* leaders of the Papuan Presidium in February 2002 declares that “Earth, sea, air, and all their natural wealth are the property of the *adat* people of Papua (and) cannot be sold to any party”, though these resources may be sustainably exploited by investors “in the interest of the political aspirations of the Papuan people.”⁷⁵

The Papuan leaders have chosen various actions from rebellion to non-violent political protests. The accommodation policies of the new leaders of Indonesia toward Papuan activism and together with the precedence of East Timor’s separation, can be suspected encouraging the Papuan leaders to choose peaceful actions for their idealism. Papuan leaders who live and struggle with the people on a daily basis are more likely to choose these kinds of peaceful actions while most of the Papuan leaders in exile identified themselves with the rebellion actions of OPMs.

D. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

This part of the thesis examines the international political environment that helps shape the aspirations, opportunities, and strategies of Papuan ethno-political groups; and, at the same time, affects the policies of the GOI toward the conflict. The explanation from this sub-section shows that in Indonesia, the international community pays great attention to its problem in the Papua province. This attention can be the source of help to solve Indonesia’s problem both on the national and provincial levels. According to Gurr, the nature of international engagement is a major determinant of whether ethno-political conflicts are of short duration or long, and of whether they end in negotiated settlements or humanitarian disasters.⁷⁶

The thesis examines some of the findings of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Commission on Peace and Progress in Papua. The Council noted some donor countries, international organizations, international finance institutions, multinational corporations who are operating in the province, and international non-governmental organizations as the international stakeholders of the conflict.⁷⁷ The

⁷⁵ Statement given by the Presidium in ICG, Ibid., p. 13.

⁷⁶ Gurr, Ibid., p. 70.

⁷⁷ The Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action, “Indonesian Commission: Peace and Progress in Papua” in *Report of an Independent Commission* (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003) p. 12.

international stakeholders have raised their concern about the escalation of the conflict that becomes more and more violent and pressured the Indonesia government.

1. Donor Countries

The United States is the most important donor country for Indonesia post 9/11. The tragedy resulted in Indonesia becoming an important ally to the United States, especially on the war on terrorism. The U.S. government and its agencies are committed to consolidating Indonesia's political and economic reform and have focused their programs on eight provinces including Papua. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, increased its budget from \$129.3 million in 2002 to \$141.7 million (in request) in 2003.⁷⁸ These numbers are double those of the AusAid budget which was only \$77.7 million (data of 2002).⁷⁹ Another fact shows that the U.S. policy toward the Papua province is also shaped by its concern to protect the PT Freeport mine that continues to operate in the province. The ICG reported that Freeport has long been well-connected within the U.S. political establishment, and its board members include Henry Kissinger and J. Stapleton Roy, the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia from 1995 to 1999.⁸⁰

In contrast with Indonesia, Australia's previous "cold" relationship relates to the East Timor case, and Australia remains another important donor country to Indonesia, again for the same reason of the war on terrorism. After the Bali bombing, Australia has revitalized its efforts to work with Indonesia in implementing a bilateral antiterrorism agreement and eradicating conditions conducive to terrorism.⁸¹ Australia's concerns about the Papua conflict are also influenced by the flow of Papuan refugees to the country which inflames domestic concerns over immigration and asylum policies.⁸² It is also the Aussie in many of Australia's big cities who strongly supports Papuan ethno-political activism. In addition, they are advocating their support through seminars, researches, and websites.

⁷⁸ See [www.usaid.gov] (March 2004).

⁷⁹ See [www.uastembjak.or.id] (March 2004).

⁸⁰ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua" in *ICG Asia Report* No.39, 13 September 2002, p. 20.

⁸¹ The Council on Foreign Relations, *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁸² *Ibid.*

It is in the best interests of several donor countries to support good governance in Indonesia, such as the Dutch through the Dutch Ministry for International Cooperation; Canada through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); and Germany through the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and German Bank for Reconstruction and Development (KfW), while the United Kingdom is interested in poverty reduction's programs through the work of the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

2. International Organization

According to the Council, international organizations emphasize consensus decision-making and are typically wary of conflict-prevention initiatives.⁸³ The UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) incorporates preventive development strategies into the activities of the UN specialized agencies: United Nation Development Program (UNDP), United Nation Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nation Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nation Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and United Nation Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The European Union (EU) in the meantime finalized a "Conflict Prevention Assessment" on behalf of the European Commission (EC) Development Cooperation Programme, focusing on good governance and sustainable natural-resource management. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the other hand, almost voices nothing as its gentleman's agreement prevents the organization from intervening in the domestic problems of each member.

The Pacific Island Forum, which in the past was sympathetic to the Papuan pro-independence movements, now supports the Indonesian Unity as of August 2002. This endorsement contradicts the previous efforts of its members such as the Vanuatu, Nauru, and the Solomon Islands who supported Papuan ethno-political activism more. According to the International Crisis Group, the Papua Presidium Council has made an intensive international lobbying to involve international communities in their struggle.⁸⁴ The

⁸³ Ibid., p. 34.

⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya" in ICG *Asia Report* No. 23, 20 September 2001.

President of Nauru and the Prime Minister of Vanuatu had sponsored the Presidium at the UN Millennium Summit and at the Pacific Islands Forum in October 2000.

3. International Finance Institutions

The main role of the finance institutions is to help Indonesia recover from the Asian Financial Crisis. The IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank have agreed to provide more loans to promote macroeconomic stability programs in Indonesia. The finance institutions also put some concessional terms on the objectives of increasing public services, strengthening capacity to implement economic and social policies, and enhancing transparency. The donor countries have also asked the finance institutions to link future financing to conflict prevention programs in Indonesia.⁸⁵

4. Multinational Corporations

Many multinational corporations are operating in the Papua province. The examination of the positive aspects and the negative impacts of them, with an example from PT Freeport, are explored in Chapter II. With regard to their role in economic development both at the national and provincial levels, they can further promote moderation by promoting projects benefits with the people of Papua.⁸⁶ PT. Freeport, for example, established the Voluntary Land Rights Trust Fund in 2001 that provides public facilities such as education, health, business, and other infrastructures. Such activities should be expanded and supported by the government of Indonesia, especially the provincial government.

5. International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs)

Many INGOs serve as the implementing partners of official donors in the Papua province through various project purposes. The Catholic Relief Services, for example, work to monitor funding streams, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance at the same time. Inter-News specializes in developing media institutions and new-reporting skills in television and radio for democracy education and civil-society building. It supports Papuan local radio stations and newspapers in a number of cities and produces a radio program called “Reporting for Peace” which seeks to cultivate a culture of peaceful resolution to local conflicts.⁸⁷ There is also a new U.S.-based NGO with an advisory

⁸⁵ The Council Relation, Ibid., p. 37.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 41.

board of Papuan religious, educational, and cultural leaders, called the Papua Resource Center (PRC), who seeks to promote social welfare and indigenous culture in Papua by facilitating relationships between the Papuan-based organizations and those in the international community with an interest in the region.

All of the international stakeholders that were previously examined have influenced and determined the escalation and de-escalation of the Papua conflict. Their sympathies, by providing material, political, and moral support, contribute substantially to the cohesion and political mobilization of the Papuan ethno-political groups. Also, at the same time, they pressure Indonesia's government to respond positively. However, they also may provoke responses that offset opportunities. Weak regimes facing ethno-political challenges frequently seek bilateral military assistance and political support that enhance their capacity to encounter the challenges.⁸⁸ Such bilateral military assistance in counter-terrorism between Indonesia and the United States or between Indonesia and Australia can be a case where the state will use the assistance to deal with Papuan ethno-political activism.

E. CONCLUSION

The origin and dynamics of the Papua conflict at the local and national levels is complex. Papuan ethno-political actions presuppose an identity group that shares valued cultural traits and some common grievances or aspirations. These sentiments and interests provide the essential bases for mobilization and shape the kinds of claims made by group leaders. A shared identity and interest are the elements from which Papuan educated leaders forge a group's capacity for their political actions. The timing of the action and the choice of strategies of participation, protest, or rebellion depend largely on political opportunities external to the group, principally its relationship to the state and external actors.

The variety of responses of the GOI to the Papua conflict have been mainly determined by national leaders, in this case the President, and the regime in power at the time being. This thesis argues that the more democratic the regime, the more accommodating they are to the demands of the Papuans. The challenge to the new government, however, is to perform the new democratic institution that is both responsive

⁸⁸ Gurr, Ibid., p. 88.

and effective. According to Putnam, a high performance democratic institution must be sensitive to the demands of its constituents and effective in using limited resources to address those demands.⁸⁹ As in the case of the Papua province, the government's new policies must be able to convince the indigenous people that it is their best interests to be within a unitary state of Indonesia. This thesis will look at the level of institutionalization of the central government and the degree to which the political leaders accommodate the demands for more local autonomy or decentralization in the Papua province. Institutionalization here refers to both a normative and an organizational component of the central government. It indicates, through other studies, that the multiple effects of environmental scarcity, including economic decline and large population movements, may sharply weaken the administrative ability, internal coherence, and legitimacy of the state in some poor countries. Weakened state legitimacy further raises the likelihood of civil violence. Indonesian state legitimacy is based on sustained economic development and when the general resource declines, it impacts the legitimacy of the state.

The general finding from the international stakeholders supports material, moral, and military items for both the Papuan ethno-political groups and the Indonesian government and will increase both the capacities and opportunities to deal with the conflict in more peaceful ways. However, this thesis also recognizes other possible opposite results in which the conflict will be protracted, more violent, and highly resistant to settlement.

⁸⁹ Putnam, Robert. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1993, p. 9.

IV. DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A. INTRODUCTION

The Papua conflict is an asymmetric or structural conflict as it is a conflict between the government of Indonesia and a minority group of Papuan ethnicity. The root causes of the conflict lie in the structure that divides their identities and roles and the relationship between them. Also, this unbalanced structure of roles and relationships cannot be changed as “the top dog always wins, the underdog always loses.”⁹⁰ The conflict, therefore, is useful to indicate the need for changing the unbalanced structure relationship, although this can never be in the interests of the top dog.⁹¹ The cost of conflict, however, is imposed on all the parties and stakeholders of the conflict. Thus, a need for a peaceful conflict resolution exists through a shift from the existing structure of the relationships to another.

The purpose of this thesis is to transform what were un-peaceful and un-balanced structural relationships in the Papua conflict into peaceful and dynamic ones. Ethno-political groups that challenge the governments with rebellion or large-scale protest campaigns almost always elicit repressive responses. Even if political elites want to reach an accommodation, their first priority usually is to (re) establish public order and security. The findings of Minority at Risk⁹², however, suggests that severe state repression is more likely to prolong and intensify than to suppress it, by a ratio of two to one. That is, twelve episodes of ethno-political conflicts in which severe repression was used continued or intensified, in contrast with six episodes in which repression achieved a short-term increase in security for the government that used it. The comparison suggests that the most effective strategy during the survey period was a negotiated settlement. Such a settlement, the project mentions, helped de-escalate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Gagauz attempt to secede from Moldova, and the Tuareg rebellions in Niger and Mali. They also helped to resolve racial conflicts in South Africa. This thesis believes

⁹⁰ Miall, et all, *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Ted Robert Gurr, *People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000) p. 127.

that there are many ways in which this passage can be approached without using force of coercion. The Gandhian tactics of “speaking the truth”, influencing and persuading the power-holders, can be one of the examples. There are also the tactics of mobilizing popular movements, increasing solidarity, making demonstrations of resolve, and establishing a demand for change. Another tactic is to strengthen and empower the underdogs. Thus, the challenge to this thesis is to find a creative peaceful solution for the Papua conflict.

B. PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AS A PROCESS

This thesis looks at the current situation of the Papua conflict in terms of Curles’ model.⁹³ The model illustrates the passage from an un-peaceful to a peaceful relationship that may involve a temporary increase in overt conflict as people become aware of imbalances of power and injustice affecting them (stage 1, education or ‘conscientization’), organize themselves and articulate their grievances (stage 2, confrontation), come to terms in a more equal way with those who held a preponderance of power over them (stage 3, negotiation), and finally, join in restructuring a more equitable and just relationship (stage 4, resolution).




Figure 7. The Progression of Conflict

⁹³ Adam Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock, 1971).

This thesis argues that the Papua conflict is in Quadrant 2 of Curle's model. In quadrant 2, the conflict becomes an overt one and there are confrontations between the Indonesia government and the Papuan groups. The confrontation involves a series of violent repressions by the Indonesian security forces, which results in an escalation of conflict, to accommodative policies and new administrative regulations. In the meantime, the people in the Province become aware about their problems and grievances; they organize themselves in the form of Papuan ethno-political groups and speak out about it. Other components of Papua civil society such as churches, students and non-governmental organizations actively advocate the Papuan problem at the national and international level. As a result, people at the local, national, and international levels are informed about the Papuan local problem and raise their concern about the conflict. Awareness by the national people and international community then has an important role in confronting the Indonesia's government's 'top dog' and assisting the Papuan ethno-political group's "underdog" in the transformation process.

In practice, this structural change will require a rebalancing of power in the relationship between the Indonesian government and the Papuan ethno-political groups through recognizing one another in new ways. Such recognition will increase the voice and participation of the underdog in addressing their basic needs and will justify their concerns. As in the case of the Papua conflict, the new regimes of the post New Order regime have showed new intensities and are more likely to follow policies of recognition, pluralism, and group autonomy. These new policies provided an opportunity for the Papuan ethno-political groups to openly voice their idealism. In February 1999, a delegation of 100 Papuan ethno-political leaders went to Jakarta to meet with the new president of Indonesia, B. J. Habibie, as part of what was billed as a "National Dialogue" on the future of the Papua province.⁹⁴ Unexpectedly, they expressed their desire to separate from Indonesia and establish a transitional government under the supervision of the United Nations.⁹⁵ The Papuan indigenous people in the province reacted enthusiastically to the dialogue and started to show their support by setting up a

⁹⁴ International Crisis Group, "Dividing Papua: How Not to Do It" in *ICG Asia Briefing Paper*, 9 April 2003.

⁹⁵ Human Right Watch, "Indonesia: Human Rights and Pro-independence Actions in Papua, 1999-2000", Vol. 12, May 2000, pp. 10-12.

“communication post” or POSKO to gather around and spread the open statement of their leaders. The reaction of the Indonesian security forces at the provincial level, the tension, and the results after the violent confrontations between the forces and the people who gathered around the POSKO can be read in Chapter II in the sub-section on Behavior Issue.

It was in this atmosphere that the central government through the provincial government in Papua began to promote the idea of dividing the province into three. The formal reason given was to improve government services.⁹⁶ The reaction of the Papuan people and their leaders, however, were negative as they thought that the division was a reaction to their organized support of independence.⁹⁷ The provincial parliament also rejected and recommended the plan be cancelled to which the governor of Papua province finally agreed. Also, the plan of division was finally never implemented. In 2003, the President Megawati administration re-issued the plan of division and released a presidential instructional about it. Again, the instruction has not yet been implemented as the government and political elites of Indonesia are more focused on the forthcoming elections of 2004.

It is the hope of this thesis that the progression of the Papua conflict will move forward to Quadrant 3 toward negotiations between the Indonesian government and the Papuan ethno-political groups. To come into this phase, both parties need to increase their level of consciousness of their mutual independence. Negotiation means that both parties neither simply impose their will on nor eliminate the other side, but rather must work with one another to achieve their objectives. Both parties must also consider the cost of continuing the conflict as the cost imposed on both of them. The cost of civil war has been acknowledged with deep regret in countries where a postwar settlement are taking hold, as in Bosnia, the Philippines, Mozambique, and elsewhere. Therefore, war was not worth fighting because neither side gained anything. More ambitiously, this thesis hopes for a successful negotiation that leads to a restructuring of the relationship that deals with fundamental issues. This requires a long process consisting of functions and roles rather than an activity. Therefore, much remains to be done.

⁹⁶ ICG, *Ibid*, p. 3.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*.

C. DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Having two sets of data about the micro causes and the macro contexts of the Papua conflict adds value to this thesis by looking at both causes and contexts to develop the strategies for a peaceful conflict resolution. In doing so, this thesis takes into consideration both (1) the narrow immediate relationship and short-run micro issues; and (2) the broader more systemic contexts. This refers to a continuum transformation considering an immediate relationship and short-term issues with long-term systemic contexts. In other words, transform the conflict from violence to politics. Therefore, there are stages and various activities that require specific policies and coordination. As suggested in Lederach's sustainable peace model, the task includes brokering a cease-fire and negotiating a peace agreement, or implementing a multifaceted peace accord.⁹⁸

1. Relationship and Contradiction Issues

The most obvious precondition for a return to the political, as opposed to military, peaceful conflict resolution is the achievement of a cease-fire and the start of a process leading to some kind of settlement. In the context of the Papua conflict, both the Indonesian government and the Papuan ethno-political groups and other civil society groups must participate in the process. First, they have to address the immediate issues to end the violence. Law enforcement by civilian police instead of military operations is necessary for the Indonesian security forces. On the other hand, disarming the OPMs to maintain local security is another necessity. A security dilemma is possible as distrust exists in the Indonesian security forces among the Papuans. The OPMs can be expected to reject the policy as they doubt and question whether the Indonesian security forces are taking advantage of the opportunity to destroy the OPMs. The Indonesian government has to understand this phenomenon as people or groups with guns are uneasy about their future. Therefore, it seems reasonable to have third party intervention as observers, i.e., the UN civilian police. The third party could play an essential role in bridging the transition, reassuring each side that the other is complying long enough for mutual trust to build and infant institutions to develop, perhaps formally guaranteeing the process.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington D.C.: United Nations Institute for Peace, 1997)

⁹⁹ Roy Licklider, "Obstacles to Peace Settlements" in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington D.C.: USIP Press, 2001) pp. 687-718.

In contrast to cases of protests and demonstrations in Western democracies where law enforcement “view their job to be managing rather than repressing”¹⁰⁰ protests, the Indonesian security forces are within their lawful mandate according to the existing Criminal Code, Article 106, which “allows for prosecution of those engaged in peaceful advocacy of independence.”¹⁰¹ The Indonesia government needs to repeal or amend this particular article and others that criminalize legitimate peaceful activities. The government should drop criminal charges against all defendants currently on trial for the peaceful expression of their political views. Instead of arresting community leaders linked to the peaceful advocacy of independence, the Indonesian government can reduce tensions by cooperating through meaningful dialogues. The benefit of community relations as in Brixton¹⁰² and Los Angeles¹⁰³ may prove valuable to developing a trust relationship between law enforcement personnel and Papuans. This step, in the long run, will help the Indonesian government to identify and prosecute militant Papuans who are violating existing laws. A community relations program, of course, would require radical changes in their attitudes of racism, and the incorporation of local people into the ranks of the security forces. Also, these benefits can serve as a valuable basis for other political and socio-economic development programs within the province.

In the long run, the Indonesian government has to undertake several measures to improve and advance the promotion and protection of human rights. A new law was approved that separates the police from the military in 2000 and makes the national police directly accountable to the president. Accordingly, the police assumed the primary responsibility of maintaining security and public order that is now under civil rather than military law. This significant structural change will be the vehicle for police reorientation and education in promoting and fostering a culture of respect for human rights. With

¹⁰⁰ Donatella Della Porta and Herbert Reiter, ed., *Policing Protests: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

¹⁰¹ Saunders, *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Lord Scarman, *Scarman Report: The Brixton Disorders*.

¹⁰³ Lou Cannon, *Official Negligence: How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999).

respect to the Papuan indigenous people, the government has to adopt policies aimed at addressing human rights concerns and improving the socio-economic plight with the end view of de-escalating violence.

Secondly, as the Papua conflict structure also consists of incompatible political, economic, and social issues, these issues need to be addressed when changing the structure. The Indonesian government has implemented a regional autonomy policy devolving national power to the regional government. Specifically, the Special Autonomy Law 21/2001 “acknowledged and granted to the Papua province to regulate and manage the interests of the local people at its own initiative based on the aspiration and fundamental rights of the people of Papua.”¹⁰⁴ The objective of special autonomy is political. It is to persuade the Papuans that their preferred future should be as citizens of Indonesia, and an Indonesia in which they can manage their own political development and enjoy the produce of their lands and its resources.¹⁰⁵ Under this policy, the Papua province will have greater autonomy to self-govern and preserve its unique identity and traditions. The economic provision of the Law states that the province will receive 80% of the central government’s revenue from Papua’s natural resource exploitation. Politically, the Special Autonomy states that there will be a bicameral legislature with an upper chamber in which Papuan traditional authority, religious organizations, women and youth are represented, and the governor and vice governor of the province must be Papuan.¹⁰⁶ The Law also states that the government of Indonesia recognizes the ownership of the Papuans to their land. The Law, at the same time, is strongly committed to the protection of human rights.

This Special Autonomy policy seems to satisfy the demands of the Papuan ethno-political groups. However, experience has made Papuans highly skeptical of the government’s intentions. The issue of the Presidential Instruction of 2003, again, has

¹⁰⁴ *Indonesian Law 21/2001*, available on-line at [<http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.rtf>] (November 2003).

¹⁰⁵ International Crisis Group, “Ending Repression in Irian Jaya” in *ICG Asia Report*, No. 23, 20 September 2001.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

proven their doubt. Therefore, the process of sharing power from the national to local government needs to be more firmly anchored in the constitution. It needs gradual constitutional reform.

The policy of the Indonesian government to share power with its local governments is necessary and a must. Theoretically, this decentralization reform will, in turn, support the democratization process of Indonesia. The decentralization will result in the government being closer to the people. However, this thesis argues, the implementation of the decentralization needs a long process of preparation and education of the local government. For more than three decades, the administrative system of the Indonesian government has been very centralized and personalized around the political elites of the central government. In practice, the local governments have no clue how to self-govern. Their jobs were to execute, not to make, the policies as the central government made the all-important decisions.

The decentralization of the Papua province may be presented as the worse case scenario, as its political geography covers a vast and diverse territory and consists of more than 300 tribes amongst whom it is very difficult to communicate, both because of their geographical challenges and different languages. At the same time, the level of education and experience of the local people in administration is low as the majority of the Papua civil servants so far are non-Papuan. Therefore, this thesis argues, the plan of the central government of Indonesia to divide the Papua province into three provinces makes sense. The division can ease the process of administration and the delivery of services to the people. Also, at the same time, it will provide the local people the opportunity to participate in the administration of the local government.

However, many objections to the division of the Papua province have been raised by the people both at the local, national, and international communities. They assume that the plan's objective is to weaken the Papuan ethno-political activism and the people's support of group ideas. They are also afraid that the division of the province will provide the Indonesian security forces more leverage to expand their operational territories and personnel. Whatever the reasons their objections indicate a low level of trust from the local people and international communities towards the Indonesian government. On the

other hand, the Indonesian government did not consult with the local government and parliament of the Papua province nor did it explain and convey the objective of the division. Here again, the case shows the character of the centralistic decision-making process of the Indonesia administration and, at the same time, the unbalanced relationship between the national and local governments.

2. Actors and Activities

As the relationship and conflicting issues are addressed in the previous sub-section, this part of the thesis will focus on the actors and appropriate activities at the different levels in society affected by the conflict. This can be approached through reconciliation. Reconciliation is a meeting point where concerns about both the past and the future can meet.¹⁰⁷ It suggests that the space for acknowledging the bitter past and envisioning a better future is the necessary condition for reframing the present. In more specific terms, reconciliation can be seen as dealing with three specific paradoxes.¹⁰⁸ First, in an overall sense, reconciliation promotes encounters between the open expression of the painful past and the search for the articulation of a long-term, interdependent future. Second, reconciliation provides a place for truth and mercy to meet, where concerns for relationships are validated and embraced. Third, reconciliation recognizes the need to provide the time and place for both justice and peace to occur, where redressing the wrong is held together by envisioning a common and connected future.

A fundamental question is how to create a catalyst for reconciliation and then sustain it. This can be achieved through developing a political process, structures and cultures which can make the participation of all people in the province possible in the public decisions and actions that affect their lives.¹⁰⁹ Yet, there is no tradition for government-wide participation in the Papua province. Therefore, this thesis argues, it is important to begin to establish it and to start with an inclusive political system. This

¹⁰⁷ Lederach, *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁰⁹ Diana Francis, “Conflict Transformation: from Violence to Politics” (A Discussion Paper) in *Committee for Conflict Transformation Support News Letter*, No. 9, [<http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts9/vipolint.htm>]. (March 2004)

thesis will use Lederach's peace-building pyramidal model¹¹⁰ to illustrate the process of people participation in a new government in the Papua province. The pyramid model shows the responses of people at different levels with a particular emphasis on the significance of the bottom-up process. The model describes the numbers within a population in simplified terms: a. (1) top leadership; b. (2) middle-range leadership; and c. (3) grassroots leadership.

a. Top Leadership

The pinnacle or top-level leadership represents the fewest people, and in some instances, only a handful of key actors within the broader setting (governor, mayors, the head of the local police and military, the heads of departments, leaders of the Papuan ethno-political groups). They are at the apex of the pyramid, the spoke-persons for their constituencies and for the concerns that, they argue, generate and will resolve the conflict. These leaders are perceived and characterized as having significant power and influence. They do high-level negotiations and are brought to the bargaining table. Getting to the table and setting the agenda for negotiations become the guiding principles for this level of negotiations. The approach is what might be called the top-down approach. This approach assumes that the accomplishment at the highest level will translate to, and move down through, the rest of the population. Also, the accord will have to be relevant and the leaders capable of practical implementation at the local level.

b. Middle-Range Leadership

In the middle range are persons whose positions are defined in ways not necessarily connected or controlled by the authority or structures of the formal government or major opposition movements. Examples are NGOs leaders, religious leaders, tribe leaders, and intellectuals. However, they are positioned so that they are likely to know and be known by the top-level leaders, yet they have significant connections to the broader context and the constituency that the top leaders claim to represent. In sum, the middle-range actors are far more numerous than are top-leaders and are connected through networks to many influential people across the human and physical geography of the conflict.

¹¹⁰ Lederach, *Ibid.*, pp. 38-55.

c. Grassroots Leadership

At the bottom are grassroots leaders who represent the masses or the base of society. The leaders at this level, as well as the people, are involved in day-to-day efforts for basic survival including food, water, shelter, and safety. These leaders intimately understand the fear and suffering in which much of the population must live.

D. MEDIATION: A NECESSARY THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION

Third party intervention can be described as “a full range of methods and tools whereby a variety of external parties, for instance, the United States, other major powers, the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations, may become involved in attempts to cope with conflict.”¹¹¹ The form of interventions greatly ranges between doing nothing and sending in the Marines. Crocker mentions several key variables of the intervention spectrum:

- the stage of conflict: its status, form, and ripeness
- the character of the society in which the conflict occurs
- the nature of the parties involved in the conflict and their decision making system
- The character of the potential third parties: their capabilities, leverage, and ties to (or fit with) the parties, their level of interest, and the sustainability of their potential commitment to the role of intervention.

In some cases, international involvements/interventions were at the invitation of the host government. Requiring an invitation, however, also means that such an invitation will not come, with the consequence that an intrastate conflict will be “protected” from international actions. The norm of sovereignty as a responsibility as it pertains to preventing intrastate violence needs to be strengthened sufficiently to legitimize early action to prevent, and not just respond to, genocides and other deadly violence and humanitarian crises. Intervention should be viewed as a full-time job for those in charge. It should be run like a task force around the clock. This principle is valid on an intergovernmental basis as well as within the individual government, and for both diplomatic and military interventions.

¹¹¹ Fen Osler Hampson, “Parent, Midwife, or Accidental Executioner? The Role of Third Parties in Ending Violent Conflict” in *Turbulent Peace* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001).

Among political scientists, the debate about appropriate intervention strategies can be characterized as a debate between “realist” and “liberal”¹¹² (Hampson, 2001). The realist differentiates between “hard” and “soft” approaches. The hard realist argues for a narrow range of intervention that largely revolves around the use of force (threatened or actual) to restore order. The soft realist contemplates a wide range of policy options that include diplomacy and mediation as intervention strategies for changing the cost-benefit calculus of warring parties in favor of a negotiated political settlement. Liberalists, on the other hand, approach conflict management and third-party intervention through “governance based” and “socio-psychological” approaches. It stresses the role of societal actors more in peace-building and the creation of new norms, at both psychological and institutional levels, than transforming attitudes leading to a process of reconciliation, since the sources of conflict are seen as psychological and rooted in the perception of injustice and victimization.

1. The Need of Third-Party Intervention

The major finding of this thesis is that the conflict between the central government of Indonesia and the local people of the Papua province occurs in full conflict.¹¹³ Each of the Conflict Triangle components, *contradicting issues*, *attitude*, and *behavior*, already exist. The three components interact and influence each other in a dynamic way. One of the findings shows that there is mutual distrust toward each other’s party. This makes direct negotiation of a peaceful resolution seem difficult if not impossible. Therefore, interventions from third parties are badly needed.

Unfortunately, the GOI seems to be too sensitive to such kinds of interventions. The government has stated that the movement for Papua’s independence has been categorized as a separatist movement and separatism will not be tolerated, and the government imposes harsher security force actions on the Papua province. The central government of Indonesia has rejected the offers of its neighboring Pacific countries (Nauru, New Zealand, and Australia) for such a mediation intervention process. The GOI feels that these countries are not objective and tend to be more supportive of the Papuan

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage, 1996).

independent movements. Many exiled Papuans live in these countries and they are very active in advocating independence for the Papua province. Also, the harsh actions of the Indonesian security forces have attracted more regional and global concerns on humanitarian and human rights issues.

On the other hand, the Papuans have called for peaceful dialogue more often with mediation by third party intervention. This demand for intervention indicates that the Papuans have come to accept that pursuing the conflict is unlikely to achieve their goals. At this point, mediation as a form of third party intervention is very important. The GOI has to respond to this situation to begin to find a way to resolve its conflict, and at the same time, maintain its territorial integrity. Allowing greater self-government may make it more acceptable for Papuans to be a part of Indonesia but might also encourage the independence movement. Either approach will force both parties to negotiate and find acceptable solutions for both of them.

2. What Kind of Intervention Can Be Done?

The finding of this thesis parallels the view of liberalists concerning the causal-relationship logic of the conflict sources. However, when looking at the context of the conflict, this thesis argues that the approach to third party intervention can be combined with soft realism and governance and socio-psychological approaches. The approach can be started with mediation. Mediation is a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution that they cannot find by themselves. It is not based on the direct use of force and it is not aimed at helping one of the participants win. Its purpose is to bring the conflict to a settlement that is acceptable to both sides and consistent with third party interests. It is a political process with no advance commitment from the parties to accept the mediator's idea. In this respect, it differs from arbitration that employs judicial procedures and issues a verdict that the parties have committed themselves beforehand to accept. To accomplish its purposes, mediation must be made acceptable to the adversaries in the conflict, who must in turn, cooperate diplomatically with the intervener.

However, some sensitive issues need to be addressed in order to call for third-party mediation. The first is the question of the mediation process and whether it can provide an acceptable outcome or not. The second is whether the would-be mediator is objective or not. The GOI has experienced, at least, two mediation experiences before,

one with its previous province, East Timor, with the United Nations as mediator. The other was mediation with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) where a non-government organization (NGO), the Henri Dunant Center, became the mediator. The first mediation did not go in favor of Indonesia and the second failed. Although the objectivity of the mediator is not called into question, the GOI puts the issue of this possible outcome as its main concern. Thus, the first diplomatic effort of the would-be mediator must be to convince the parties of the value of their services before the mediation process can begin.

3. Who Will Play the Role of the Best Intervener?

Three main external actors as would-be mediators can be identified in this paper: the United Nations, ASEAN, and international non-governmental organizations.

a. The United Nations (UN)

The UN and its agencies remain central to the international community's response to the conflict. During the Cold War, the overall effectiveness of the UN in settling interstate and intrastate situations was mixed. However, the UN become a prime instrument through which the international community attempted to defuse crises and de-escalate disputes, arrange ceasefires, organize peacekeeping, facilitate elections and monitor disengagements and demilitarization's. Nevertheless, the scope of UN action has certainly expanded. Unfortunately, combined with the organization's global mandate and a severe financial crisis, this expansion of tasks has resulted in chronic overload for the secretariat, resulting in the inevitable degrading of performance and sometimes slow response.¹¹⁴

b. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Regional organizations comprise the second tier of third party agents in contemporary conflict resolution. Boutros-Ghali proposed that regional organizations should take on the primary responsibility for conflict management, leaving the UN to accept cases only if they had failed. However, this division of labor has not yet appeared as the member states of regional organizations do not always accept the legitimacy of the group, especially when the group wants to intervene in the state's internal affairs. ASEAN, on the other hand, has been concerned about avoiding involvement in a

¹¹⁴ Miall, et al., Ibid.

member's internal affairs. With regard to the ASEAN gentlemen's agreement, it will be impossible to expect the organization to be a mediator for the conflict.

c. International Non-Government Organization (INGO)

It is still possible for non-government organizations to play a role in an internal conflict. The number of NGOs involved with conflict resolution increased rapidly in the 1980's, as development agencies, aid donors and governments became willing to fund their activities. They are at an advantage due to flexibility and adaptability to bridge the gap between elites and grass-root levels. They are able to work with protagonists without the worry of thereby conferring official recognition. However, in individual cases, the appropriateness and effectiveness of particular NGO initiatives have been criticized. In the context of the GOI – Papua conflict, the Indonesian government has accused the NGO, both locally and internationally many times of having fueled the conflict with their unbalanced information and support.

Considering the strengths and weaknesses of each possible would-be mediator, this thesis argues that the United Nations is the most appropriate mediator. In fact, the UN is still historically involved with political issues since the UN facilitated the Act of Self-determination in Papua in 1968 to 1969.

E. CONCLUSION

This thesis suggests an interdependence Conflict resolution for the Papua conflict that involve two tiers of solving relationship and conflicting issues. It demands structural and cultural changes at the national and local levels with support from the international community. Another tier addresses the different actions that have been taken by different actors at every level of the society. The response at different levels is necessary to change the contexts of the conflict: This approach is built within three assumptions:

- *Relationship* is the basis of both the conflict and its long-term solution. It is the focal point for sustained dialogue within protracted conflict settings. Reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups' affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-in-relationship.
- *Encounter*, not only of people but also of several different and highly interdependent streams of activity. Reconciliation must find ways to address the past without getting locked into a vicious cycle of mutual exclusiveness inherent in the past. People need the opportunity and space

to express to, and with, one another the trauma of loss and their grief over that loss, and the anger that accompanies the pain and the memory of injustice experienced.

- *Acknowledgement* through hearing one another's stories which validates the experience and feelings and represents the first step towards the restoration of the person and the relationship. At the same time, reconciliation must envision the future in a way that enhances interdependence. Opportunity must, therefore, be given to people to look forward and envision their shared future. The perspective of the native peoples is highly instructive in this respect.

In case of the Papua conflict, the implication policies go beyond conflict management in which requires short-term and long-term policies. Short-term policies such as accommodation and sub-state autonomy or decentralization will be very critical. Though the legitimacy of the Indonesian state over the Papua province is unquestionable, it is only by developing and promoting sharing power and greater role to the Papuan indigenous people in provincial government can Indonesia generate local and international support and encouragements. Accommodation seems to be very costly since the government of Indonesia gives highest preservation of the integrity of the Indonesia state and its territory. But, theoretically, provincial autonomy or decentralization is the broad middle ground in which solutions are more likely to be found. It less threatening to the state elites to negotiate a transfer of regional power to ethno-nationalists than to share power at the center with revolutionary challengers. And ethno-nationalists are more likely to regard autonomy as an acceptable alternative to independence. In the long-term, solution such as settlement will be more likely to solve the problem in more sustainable way. Here the international communities can play critical roles as mediator for negotiation and the guarantor for the implementation of the settlement.

V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis has looked at different ways to analyze the Papua conflict. It found a bewildering variety of factors and circumstances that conspire to make a situation prone to conflict. It also found deep political, economic, social, and historical roots that are fueled by enduring grievances as well as ongoing inequalities. These deep root causes were held in check for decades by the military authoritarian regime of the New Order. The collapse of the authoritarian regime and the emergence of more democratic leaders afterwards are allowing long-suppressed grievances to come to the fore and head towards Papuan ethno-political activism.

As this thesis indicates that a proper analysis of the conflict is important for reaching an effective resolution, the findings of this thesis then are explored for policies and strategies in resolving the conflict. The conflict in Papua becomes an exchange of hostile behavior, grounded in mutually hostile attitudes, over some political, social, and economic issues. Therefore, the conflict resolution suggestion of this thesis requires a set of dynamic changes from the conflicting parties that involve a de-escalation of conflict behavior, a change in attitude, and transforming the relationship or clashing interests at the core of the conflict structure.

This thesis is written with the hope that the future government of Indonesia will look at the conflict as an integral part of the democratization process in Indonesia. In doing so, the future government will prefer to make other choices rather than repression with the use of force. A government's use of force against people is likely to inspire fear and caution in the short-run, but in the longer term, repression provokes resentment and lasting incentives to resist and retaliate. The recommendations of this thesis, therefore, are based on the findings from micro and macro analyses of the conflict. The findings from the micro analysis of the Papua conflict suggest short term solutions such as accommodation and sub-state autonomy or decentralization. The macro analysis, on the other hand, is an analysis of the contexts of the Papua conflict. The macro findings suggest a long-term solution such as a settlement.

B. THE CAUSES AND CONTEXTS OF PAPUA CONFLICT

The Papua conflict remains an important issue for Indonesia despite the many difficulties faced by the nation in other areas such as Aceh, West Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, and Maluku. Like other indigenous people in many countries around the world, the Papuan conflict is an issue of self-determination that the previous Indonesia's authorities of the New Order regime were unwilling to cede. Instead, they executed more centralistic policies with total disregard to the local capacities and its leaders; and looked at the problem as separatism which implies the heavy handed military approaches within the counter insurgency framework. These policies result in the escalation of the conflict; heightened local grievances; and more sympathies and support of the resistance movements within the local population as well as international communities.

The national leaders of the post New Order regime, however, have showed new proclivities and increased civilian capacities for responding to the Papua conflict. They are more likely to follow policies of recognition, pluralism, and group autonomy. Three presidents after Soeharto recognized the deep suffering of the Papuan people from political repression, human rights abuses, and economic exploitation during the New Order regime. They opened dialogues with Papuan traditional and political leaders and allowed the Papuans to exercise their ethnic identities such as naming the province Papua instead of Irian Jaya, raising the traditional flag, and singing the Papuan anthem. More fundamentally, the government passed legislation of “Special Autonomy” for the Papua province that grants the province local control over natural resources, provides significant power to the local government and guarantees the cultural and religious rights of the indigenous people of Papua. The government of Indonesia hopes that the Special Autonomy Law will convince the Papuans that the best place for them is within the unitary state of Indonesia. The Papuans, at the same time, accept the law and have high expectation about the law as a guarantor of their demands for more justice, equality, and local participation in the provincial government.

The presidential instruction of 2003 to divide the province into three provinces should not be interpreted as the executor of the Special Autonomy law. Instead, it can be explained as a complement regulation that will ease the implementation of the Special Autonomy law. This can be true as this thesis found inadequate local institutions the

diversity of the Papuan society consisting of more than 300 tribes scattered across jungle, forest, highland, and island, and relatively low population densities that can pose serious challenges for the local government to manage the decentralization process. The strong rejection of local provincial and international communities about the division of the province, however, can be explained as a reflection of the lack of trust toward the Indonesian government rather rejection of its substance.

The years of Indonesian state reform from 1998 to the present, also remain an important period for the Papuan ethno-political groups especially when the window of opportunities for their political activism was opening. Although they were not involved in the process of Indonesia's state reform as was the rest of Indonesia, the Papuans took advantage of the event. They are openly forming their ethno-political ideas and challenging the newly democratic government of Indonesia's demand for "independence". The term independence can be best described as a demand for freedoms such as freedom from repression, inequality, injustice, and underdevelopment. It can be said that the Papua province is experiencing political transition. The result is not yet clear but hope remains that the Special Autonomy law that has been granted to the Papua province will guarantee the achievement of Papuan political demands.

In the meantime, international communities and their political ideas directly and indirectly influence the Papua conflict. The international community awareness of the issue of human rights shapes the policies of the Indonesian government on dealing with the Papuan groups, and thus the government of Indonesia becomes more aware of the casualties of human rights abuses. Papuan's refugees and Diasporas who live in the neighboring countries such as Papua New Guinea and Australia also help to advocate the ideas of Papuan ethno-nationalism. They can generate support from the communities in which they live and obtain both material and psychological support that can renew the conflict. The flow of refugees to the neighboring countries also increases the sense of human security among the countries and such sources pressure the government of Indonesia to resolve the conflict in a more peaceful way.

C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the legitimacy of the Indonesian state over the Papua province is unquestionable¹¹⁵, it is only by developing and promoting the sharing of power and a greater role for the Papuan indigenous people in the provincial government that Indonesia can generate local and international support and encouragement. Accommodation seems to be very costly since the GOI's highest priority is the preservation of the integrity of the state and its territory. Theoretically, provincial autonomy or decentralization is the broad middle ground in which solutions are more likely to be found. It is less threatening to most state elites to negotiate a transfer of regional power to ethno-nationalists than to share power at the center with revolutionary challengers. Also, ethno-nationalists are more likely to regard autonomy as an acceptable alternative to independence.

According to Gurr¹¹⁶, the following principles can be suggested about the process of arriving at successful autonomy arrangements:

- Negotiations should begin as early as possible in the conflict before positions become hardened by protracted warfare.
- Ethno-political groups whose leaders demand sovereignty and independence usually are willing to settle for more limited forms of autonomy. Negotiated settlements that grant sub-state autonomy and the commensurate control of resources to a widely supported ethno national movement usually marginalize more militant and uncompromising factions. If a separatist conflict has been protracted and violent, though, some factions are likely to reject any agreement and continue fighting. Planning a coordinated response to post-settlement violence then becomes an important issue in negotiations.
- There are infinitely varied ways in which authority can be devolved to an ethno-political group. The abstract possibilities include confederalism, federalism, regional autonomy, regional administrative decentralization, and communal autonomy, or “cantonization”. The underlying principle of cantonization is to devolve political power to the smallest possible unit of decision-making and administration.
- Autonomy agreements require protracted negotiation and close attention to detail. The core questions are how much authority is to be devolved and how it is to be exercised. Other key issues may include language rights, respect for religious practices, mutual recognition of national symbols,

¹¹⁵ Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations (New York: Gunadi Graphics Inc., 2004).

¹¹⁶ Gurr, 2000, Ibid., pp. 209-210.

control of land and resources, internal security arrangements, the right to participate in central decisions that affect the group protection of the rights of minorities within the autonomous region, or any combination of these and others.

- Both parties must participate in designing an autonomy agreement.
- International actors – the United Nations, regional organizations, neighboring states – should play a role in the negotiation of autonomy agreements. First, they have more experience as mediators. Second, they can serve as guarantors of the agreement and the security of disarmed contenders. Autonomy agreements are most likely to work if they include incentives for both ethno political leaders and state elites to abide by the agreement's terms. Domestic obligations and incentives should be reinforced by international commitments to provide diplomatic support and material assistance to parties that abide by agreements and to bring pressure to bear on parties that threaten to defect from agreements.

While self-determination is the larger problem that must be resolved in the long term, the government and community leaders need to execute immediate actions to address the underlying causes of the conflict and alleviate the growing tension. If the government of Indonesia is to strengthen its legitimacy in Papua, it must openly acknowledge and deal with political and socio-economic injustices over the past four decades. In short, there will be a paradox that while the country is gearing towards democratization, certain stringent security measures are needed to stabilize the country. Ethno-political groups that challenge governments with rebellion or large scale protest campaigns almost always elicit repressive responses. Even if political elites want to reach an accommodation, their first priority usually is to reestablish public order. In principle, they can use tactical alternatives that range from intensified policing to counterinsurgency techniques. Also, at the same time, while there is little trust and confidence among the Papuans toward the central government, the government has to be able to prove it is a trustable institution for security, justice, equal rights and opportunities.

The escalating political violence in the Papua province presents a difficult challenge for future attempts to resolve the conflict. Thus far, the Indonesia government's legal and political response to the Papuan ethno-political activism has not only produced

more violence but also created a political impasse. There are, however, some serious lesson learned which might pave the way for a better approach to reduce the level of violence and offer a realistic solution to end the conflict once and for all.

The Papuan leaders can also play a significant role in reducing the conflict by addressing anti-migrant violence of the militant faction. They have been silent about the violence perpetrated by militant Papuans against migrants and remain oblivious to migrant rights. They should publicly condemn such attacks and urge supporters to discuss migration concerns while acknowledging the basic rights of migrants and their protection. To dispel unrealistic expectations of political change, community leaders can act as the conduit to the public in providing accurate information regarding political developments.

The Indonesia government has undertaken several measures to improve and advance the promotion and protection of human rights. A new law was approved that separates the police from the military in 2000 and makes the national police directly accountable to the president. Accordingly, the police assumed the primary responsibility for maintaining security and public order that is now under civil rather than military law. This significant structural change will be the vehicle for police reorientation and education in promoting and fostering a culture of respect for human rights. As regards the Papuan indigenous people, the government has to adopt policies aimed at addressing human rights concerns and improving the socio-economic plight with the end view of de-escalating violence. Already at the national level, Indonesia has implemented a regional autonomy policy devolving national power to the local government. Specifically, the Special Autonomy law 21/2001 that “acknowledged and granted to the Papua province to regulate and manage the interests of the local people at its own initiative based on the aspiration and fundamental rights of the people of the Papua.”¹¹⁷ The government’s human rights courts have been slow to appoint judges and prosecute the violations. It must do so immediately and prosecute the security force personnel responsible for the excessive use of force, torture, and murder in the *Wamena* and *Abepura* cases.

¹¹⁷ Indonesian Law 21/2001, [<http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.rtf>]. (November 2003)

In the long term, the thesis follows Kohli's argument¹¹⁸ that in a country developing democracy, self-determination movements constitute a political process whereby the central government and a variety of ethnic groups discover their relative power balances. Kohli argues that self-determination movements typically follow the shape of an inverse "U" curve. A democratic polity in a developing country encourages a group's mobilization, heightening group identities and facilitating a sense of increased group efficacy. Mobilized groups then confront state authority, followed by a more or less prolonged process of power negotiation. Such movements eventually decline as exhaustion sets in, some leaders are repressed, others are co-opted, and a modicum of genuine power sharing and mutual accommodation between the movement and the central state authority is reached.¹¹⁹ This will be more likely to happen within a given situation where a well-established central authority is well entrenched and there are firm but compromising leaders. Therefore, in order to solve the problem of self-determination movements, two dimensions in Indonesia's national political issue appear to be relevant, namely, how well central authority is institutionalized within the multicultural democracy and the willingness of the elite politics to share power and resources with the Papuan ethno-political groups.

¹¹⁸ Atul Kohli, "Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-determination Movements in India" in *the Journal of Asian Studies*, Ann Arbor, May 1997.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

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